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Cockcroft and Riddell examine trends in private  Investors initerested  in Sub-Saharan  i  .i'a
foreign direct invcstment in Sub-Saharan Africa,  are more likely to commit techntiology  and
assess how this has af'fected the host econiomics,  managemenit  tian  equity capital.  As a result,
and discuss die prospects for increased invest-  developmcnt finance institutionis  are likely to
ment in the 1990s. They examinc new or  play an increasitigly important role in mecting
nontraditional fonns ol investmcnt as wel  .as  the need for capital.
more traditional stock and flow trends. They
also focus on the relationship betwcen structurall  Thus,  ictivity in Sub-Sallaran Africa may be
adjustmcnt programs and forcign private invest-  more effective at raising the total volume of
ment.  investment than any change in thl climate of
fiscal and other incentives.
Clearly, structural adjustment programs have
had a negative effecct  on high-cost, overprotected  There is no prospect whatsoever for foreign
import-substituting industrics in Sub-Sallaran  investment to meet Sub-Sallaran Africa's risinig
Africa; some were intended to do so.  Structural  foreign exchange and savinlgs  gaps - indeed,
adjustnent  programs are expected to attract a  the prospects m-1ay  be worse in thec  1990s than in
good deal of foreign direct investment but therc  the dismal 1980s. For one tlinig, prospects in
is little evidencc yet that they are doing so.  otlhcr  parts of the rapidly changing world look
brighter and less risky and are closer to homc.
Foreign investtment  in the 1990s (as in the  For another (Catch 22), Sub-Sahlaran  Africa is
1980s) is likely to flow to a few key sectors:  unlikely to attract capital until the prospects for
energy (certainly minerals), selected export  growth improve - whichi  is more likely in
manufacturing  sectors,  and possibly  thc tourist  countries  that succecd  in attracting  m)orC  public
industry.  The least attractive area for the foreign  and private forcigin  capital.
investor is exclusively import-substituting
industrialization.
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B3ihh  iographv  lI  1  INTRODUCTION
There  is  a  (;eri  es  of  belief  its  which  taken  t oret  h-r  iii  ke  f oreign  investment
part  i cu  arly  attract  iv.-  to  Afric;ln  couLt  ries  aS  thIet  b 1 , in  t he0  1990s  Two of  the
principal  factors  inhibiting  higher  levels  of  economic  ,rowt  h  in  SSA  in  tie  1990(;
are  low  levels  of  investment  an(i  foreign  exchanige  shoit  . s.  The  first  attraction
of  foreign  inves.ment  lies  in  its  potential  to  address  bot  h  these  constraints.  Otn
the  one  hlanid,  inflows  of  foreign  investment  bring  in  foreign  exchange,  supplement
domestic  savings  and  raise  the  level  of  investment.  Oni  the  other,  import
substituting  investment  can  help  to  reduce  the  import  bill,  while  investment  in
export  industries  will  directly  increase  a  country's  foreign  exchange  earnings.
There  are,  additionally,  a  number  of  second  round  benefits  which  might  also
be  anticipated  to  arise  from  increased  foreign  investment.  These  include:  the
creation  (or  expansion)  of  local  industries  to  supply  inputs  to  the  newly-
established  plant;  a  rise  in  the  overall  level  of  domestic  demand,  boosting  incomes
and,  through  taxation,  state  revenues;  and  the  transference  of  labour  (including
management)  skills  and  technology.
A  third  benefit  would  be  the  enhancing  of  the  efficiency  of  the  domestic
economy,  an  effect  likely  to  start  occurring  prior  to  the  anticipated  investment
flows.  Significant  inflows  of  new  external  private  investment  are  only  likely  to
come  to  a  country  which  provides  a  climate  that  is  conducive  to  profit  and  in  which
it  is  relatively  easy  to  conduct  business.  To  create  such  a  climate  entails
addressing  a  range  of  domestic  problems  which  have  characterised  African  economies
increasingly  over  the  past  two  decades,  such  as  the  over-extended  state,
bureaucratic  inefficiencies,  a  wide  range  of  administered  controls,  financial  and
other  infrastructural  constraints.l  Seriously  addressing  if  not  resolving  -
these  problems  is  almost  certainly  a  pre-condition  for  new  foreign  investment,  but
it  has  the  added  benefit  of  improving  and  enhancing  the  efficiency  of  the  domestic
economy.  In  practice  the  two  issues  tend  to  be  in.erlinked,  as  creating  a  climate
more  conducive  to  raising  domestic  investment  levels  undoubtedly  enhances  the
climate  for  foreign  investment.
1  The  list  of  constraints  is  discussed  and  analysed  in  World  Bank
(1989b).The  broad  obj  ect  iveS  of  t'ti  s  piper  aIre  to  (-x;t  lII!  l,  it'  o,lo  p ec t s  for  foreign  I
investment  in  SSA  in  the  1990s  in  thte  cont  ext  of  whalt  hI.I  I apptied  ill  the  most
recent  past,  focusing  on  lovels;  and  types  of  invest  nei't  ,  oi(l  ont changes  in  policies
whlicth  have  affected,  or  could  affect  tthe  - (vel and the t%vpc  of  foreig'n  investment.
'rThe  (liscussion  clearly  shows  that  the  potential  benlefits  of  foreign  investment  are
not  being  reaped  at  present:  outside  particular  primary  sectors  of  the  economy,
especially  in  mining  and  certain  agricultural  ventuires,  there remains  a  substantial
gap  between  potential  benefits  and  anticipated  foreigi'  capital  inf'low.  Even  in
these  sectors,  levels  of  new  investments  hlave  fallen  dUring  the  1980s.  What  is
more,  new  foreign  investment  inflows  do  not  (yet)  appear  to  have  materialised  in
countries  which  have  embarked  on  substantial  structural  adjustment  programmes.  The
paper  ends  by  attempting  to  isolate  the  main  constraints  which  appear  to  be
impeding  new  foreign  investment  inflows  and  advancing  some  ideas  for  ameliorating
them.
II.  OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
IN THE 1980s
II.1  Aggregate  Trends
A  number  of  difficulties  arise  in  attempting  to  examine  trends  in  foreign
direct  investment  (FDI)  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA).  Foremost  are  inadequate
national  statistics  or  the  absence  of  data  (particularly  in  regard  to  recent  stock
data),  accentuated  by  under-reporting,  especially  of  outflows.  These  problems  are
reflected  in  part  in  the  different  estimates  published  by  the  different
international  agencies,  as  well  as  in  the  dominance,  and  therefore  influence,  of
the  atypical  Nigerid, 2 which  accounted  for  40% of  all  net  inflows  during  the  1981-
86  periods  and  where  data  are  parti.ularly  suspect.  Trends  in  aggregate  flows
across  countries  are  additionally  difficult  to  assess  for  Africa  in the  1980s
because  of  major  shifts  in  exchange  rates,  which  occurred  at  different  times  for
different  countries.
2  Nigeria  is  atypical  because  of  both  its  size  and  the  dominance  of  oil
investments.  Net  foreign  investment  to  Nigeria  averaged  over  $500  mn  a  year  from
the  mid-1970s  to  mid-1980,  twice  the  amounts  recorded  for  Cameroon  and  Gabon
combined.5
Nonetle  less, data  published  by  the  Organi  sation  for  Economic  Co-operation
and  Development  (OFCD)) and  the  United  Nations  (UN)  appear  to  indicate some firm
trends  of  foreign  investmellt  to  SSA  in  relation  to  other  regions  of  the  developing,
world.  Up  to at least the mid-1970s, foreign investment  appeared  to  have  an
aggregate influence in African economies similar to that in other areas of the
developing  world, the  major difference being the  dominance of inivestment  in  Africa
in the  primary sectors  of agriculture and mining.  During the course of the 1980s
a marked change occurred, such that today, in comparison with other areas of the
developing  world, foreign investment in  Africa plays a comparatively small role in
both overall investment and as a share of total external resource flows.
SSA 3 accounted for only 14% of the total  developing country stock of foreign
investment in 1985, falling from some 27% in the  year 1975.  Whereas in real terms
the stock of total foreign investment in all developing countries increased over
this  period by 76%, the stock  value in  SSA fell  by 8% in  real terms.  It increased
in  all other major sub-regions of the developing  world.  The trend in stock values
by sub-region at current prices is shown in Table 1.
3  These are inward stocks of foreign direct investment and are for  what
is termed Developing Africa, which includes the countries of North Africa.  The
figures for SSA are likely to have been even more  adverse.  (United Nations,
1988:25).6
Table 1
Inward Stocks of Foreign Direct Investmerit, 975 and 1985
($  bn Current)
Region  1975  1985
Value  %  Value  Z
SSA  16.5  26.8  22.3  14.0
Asia  13.0  21.4  49.6  31.2
Latin America & Caribbean  29.7  48.2  80.5  50.6
Other  2.3  3.7  6.6  4.2
Totals  61.5  100  159.0  100
Source:  UN, 1988:25.
In relatiun to the composition of the stock of foreign investment, in 1982, the
share  of  foreign investment in  all developing  countries  was distributed  as follows-
primary  sector  - 19%;  secondary  sector  - 44%,  and  tertiary  sector  - 38%.  In Asia,
the ratios were  respectively 12%, 49% and 39%, and  for Latin America and the
Caribbean, 21%, 58% and 22%.  For SSA, however, 55% was located in the primary
sector,  with only 28%  and 20%, respectively,  in the secondary  and tertiary sectors
(Dunning and Cantwell,1987).
As for flows oc foreign investment,  the recent changes  would appear to  have
been even more marked.  During the 1980s (at least up to 1987) aggregate trend
figures  indicate that  there has  been  a  fall in net  investment flows  to all
developing countries, even in current price terms.  But for most sub-regions,  and
in  aggregate, the fall in total flows  has been small.  It  has been less severe than
the fall in aggregate  net inflows, so that foreign investment  flows have tended to
form  a risinig  share  of total foreign resource inflow.  For SSA,  however, there has
been a dramatic overall fall in both the net inflow of foreign investment and in
the share of private investment to  total foreign resource  inflow, the  latter7
occurring  - in the case of  SSA - because of a rise  in official development
assistance.  According  to OECD data,  .hereas in the three year period 1980-82
direct private in-estment accounted for 9,9% of total net rpsource flows to SSA,
the ratio of foreign investment to total  external inflows had fallen to just  '.3%
for the years 1985-87.  In contrast, the ratio of direct foreign investment to
total  resource flow  for  all developing  countries  between the  same  periods rose from
10.8% to 14.4%.  It fell only marginally from 5.3% to 4.2% for all low-income
countries, stayed roughly  the same for  Asia and almost  doubled for  countries of the
Western  Hemisphere (OECD,  1989). The details  are given in  Table 2.  Little appears
to  have changed in the intervening  period to suggest  that there  has been any  marked
improvement either relatively or absolutely for SSA. 4
Table 2
Direct Private Investment  as Share of  Total Net Resource Flows. 198C to 1987
($ mn)
Direct Investment  Total Net
Resource Inflows
1980-82  1985-87  1980-82  1985-87
All developing countries  41.2  38.1  382.3  264.4
All low-income countries  5.8  5.8  '.0  137.3
Sub-Saharan Africa  5.0  1.3  50.4  56.2
Western Hemisphere  21.4  14.2  170.6  62.1
Asia  11.0  11.3  84.0  83.7
Source:  OECD, 1989: Table III.
Analysis of OECD investment data suggests that the decade from 1978 to 1987
can be split  up into three  distinct periods: 1978 to 1983, 1983 to 1985, and post-
4  The International  Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook, for October
1989, suggests a minimal rise of overall net direct investment to all developing
countries of 6% from 1987 to 1989, a figure itself lower (in  current price terms)
than that reached in all four years from 1981 to 1984, and some 70% less than the
peak of $19.8 bn reached in 1982.8
1985.  Trends in overall FDI in current prices, the flow of FDI going to SSA in
fixed (1987) prices, and trends in the flow of FDI destined for all developing
countries chatnnelled  specifically  to SSA  are reproduced respectively In Figures 1,
2  and 3.  Figure 1 shows that the contraction (in current prices) in FDI which
affected all developing countries in the early 1980s did not impinge upon the SSA
sul-region until 1982 and did not last for as long -both categories recording an
upturn post-1985.  For  all developing countries,  OECI  data  indicate a  rapid
expansion in  net inflows  of FDI after 1985,  with total flows exceeding (in  current
price terms) those reached in the early 1980s.  For SSA, however, the upturn has
been  far less marked and by 1987, levels of private foreign investment inflow
remained lower than  they were  at the  start  of the  decade.  This divergence is  shown
clearly in Figure 3.  Figure 2 traces the  annual trends in private foreign  directFigure 1
Net Foreijn Direct  InvestmentFlows  to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1979 to 1987l  bo
\''  ~/
Figure 2
Net Foreign Direct Investment to Sub-Saharan Africa. 1978/79 to 1986/87 in 1987 Prices. $  bnl0
Figure 3
The Sthare  of all Net FDI Flows to Developing Countries  _o1_pgtq  Sub-Saharan Africa
1978 to 1987. Percentage
Source (for figures 1. 2 & 3):  OECD, 1989:  Table III.I I
ilXv;tIII(.lt  fII  t  i  'I]8(,II  to(  1'8f,/81 iii  iL  li  (198)  9  -ic.eI  :  i  V  II98!,  .a:icl  idT  spIte
(; ;t  i  l,.ed  rt(  o,.'.  I  f  ()flII  . nt  out  f I ow  posit  i ill  iilk  tLt'  Illid  1( 98t)s )  levels  of
VD  I  to  SSA  Iii  I  8I  ( at  f i xel  )ri  ices)  wetre  I e  ss  t IalIi  I IIf  tI  hos  achi  eved  at  t he
st I.'I  of  t  h.  I ( 80 ;
Fipgure  4  onpar  i Iig OECD anld  Worl  Id Bank  (World  Tables)  dat  a, reveal  s  both  the  very
c(I  f  feren-  est  irmates  of  net.  FT)I  to  t he  SSA  regi  oi  and  the  very  different  aninual
ch.ange,as  in  flows  recorded  by  these  two  importanrt  sources.  OECD data suggest  fai-
more  volatilitv  than  do  World  Bank  data,  and  only  in  three  (out  of  a  possible  nine)
years  are the figures  at  all  sirai]ar  - in  1982  they  differ  fourfold.  Additionally.
in  mos;t  years since 1980,  when one sDurce shows a rise in flows the other shows a
fal  L.  Figure 5 records trends in  net FDI from World Bank sources, but excluding
Nigeria. It suggests a smoother trend  but, consistent with OECD data, indicates  a
downward trend of nirt  inflows  throughout the 1980s  and a far from stable post-1985
recovery
Figure 4
Net FDI to Sub-Sahardn Africa. i974 to 1987. Comparison of World Bank and OECD data
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Figure  5
Net  FDI to  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  1974  to  1987,  World  Bank  Data  with  and  without  Nigeria
Source  (for
Fiy.ures  4  &  5):
OECI)  (1989)  and  ,
World  Bank  World  a
T  abIes  s  1  98
(tapes),Table  3,  x
-~  x shIIow  s  t h  e
c  u  m u  1 a  t  i  v  e 
d  i  r  e  c  t
investment  flow
of  private  e1  $  P  t
investment  by
major  OECD  country  from  1976  to  1986,  and  indicates  the  dominance  of  four
countries,  the  USA,  UK,  Japan  and  France,  which  together  accounted  for  over  80%  of
total  investment  inflow.1  3
Table 3
Cumulative Investment Flows by Country of Investor. 1976 to 1986
($  mn)
Country source  Inves;tment  in $  mn  Percent
USA  2,297.0  27.4
UK  1,919.7  22.9
Japan  1,745.2  20.8
France  1 012.1  12.1
Belgium  645.2  7.7
Germany  369.5  4.4
Italy  296.5  3.5
Netherlands  105.1  1.2
World Total  8,390.7  100.0
Source:  OECD, derived from Githongo et  al.  (1988:75).
It  should  be  noted  that  these  aggregate  flows  include the  re-investment  of
unremitted profits, and re-invested funds constitute well over half of the total
private investment inflow.  In  Nigeria, for instance,  unremitted  profits accounted
for nearly all "new" FDI from 1970-74 (in the run-up to the first indigenisation
decree), and for  83% from 1982-4.  In  Kenya in 1976,  they accounted for  nearly all
FDI, and in 1986 still accounted for 45% of total foreign investment (Githongo  et
al.  1988:  119).  What  is  more,  unremitted  profits  have  frequently  been
"unremittable" except  in the nebulous long term.  In the case of Zambia, for
example, the authorities  halted all dividend  outflows for as  much as three to four
years: the option of re-investing  profits has frequently simply  been a "least  bad"
solution  to the problem  of  idle dividends.  Thus  the commitment of  offshore
corporate investors  to SSA in the  1980s  has been even lower  than the  aggregate  data
would suggest.I '4
te I  Wo  (c'lIIt  l  i('';  WhI  Ii  hIIi  t  01i('c1  II v  111.\'(  dIOli  lIl-t  .(1  I,pliVIte  ilve-stfmellIt  inl
S\  il  . . I.  ali.,  I t hIi-  Cnli i(I  Ki  n,?dom  A  recnt  an;  I - j  i  . oill  t  i ends  of  Britis  h
privatt  inve5timent  in  tt  h  indn'-;triail  sector  in  Africa  (  Pin(,1  1  1(090)  points  to
.i  I.i  j  or  wit  dl  rawal  of  liritishI  inIves iment  from  this  s(ect (J- o If  ri  can  economies  in
Ircteit  yer."s.  Bennel lI's  dat  a suggest  that  whereas  some  4%  i  niet  Bri  t i sli  private
t(re  i gn  i ndust  ri  al i rvest  ment  was  in  Africa  in  the  mid-i  (YOs, thIie share  had  dlropped
markedl y  to  jU!;t  0.  57%  by  1986  ,  fal  1 ing  in  absolute  terms  f rom anli annual  average  of
fl70  n  in  1978-8()  to  just  £28  mn  in  the  period  1985-6.5  Benn11ell's  survey  of
B ritish  iirms  conJirms  that  nearly  one  third  of  companies  which  had  investments  in
the industrial  sector in SSA in the late 1970s had disposed of them by mid-1989,
the process of disengagement having taken  place right across the continent.
Although probably on a smaller scale than the British figures, aggregate
trends of  French  investments in Africa  indicate minimal  inflows of new money
(except in oil), most investment originating from retained earnings  - even  if
there has been less of a departure of French than British companies from Africa.
Substantial disinvestment has occurred in  both Burkino Faso and the Congo, while
net foreign investment in two of the largest French-speaking economies of SSA,
C6te d'Ivoire and Senegal, has fallen sharply.  For C6te d'Ivoire, net private
investment fell from $63.5 mn a year in the period 1970-75 to $25 mn a year in
the period to 1980-86, while in the more recent 1985-87 period there was a net
private capital outflow of some $2.5 bn  (Chang and Cumby, 1990); for Senegal,
annual average private inflow was halved from $17.5 mn in 1970-75 to $9.5 mn in
the period 1980-86 (UN 1988:5).
Amnong  the "new" international investors,  Africa has always been an area of
minimal interest,  but it  has become even  more marginal in the 1980s.  Thus, taking
the entire period 1951 to 1989, Africa accounted for just 2.8% of all Japanese
private foreign investment,  a significant  fall from the  4.1% ratio recorded in  the
period 1951  to 1979 and  reflecting  higher ratios in the  late 1960s and 1970s. Thus
in the years 1982 and 1983, Japanese private investment to Africa accounted for
over 4.5% of total Japanese foreign investment;  yet by 1987 the share had fallen
sharply  to  only  0.8%  of  its  worldwide  private  investment  (JETRO,  1989).
5  Bennell's study covers 15 countries of SSA, accounting for over 90%
of all British industrial investment in Africa.Nonet  hele  ss,  as  Sh owIn  in  Tatl)e  3 ,  Japan  remained  the  third rI  d  rI (st  source  of
foreign  itivestment  from  1976  to  1986,
Recent  trends  in  private  US  investment  in  SSA  have  also  shown  sharp
contriactionis,  although  not  as  pronounced  (at  least  in  the  f irst  half of  the  1980s)
as  flows  of  private  investment  from  other  major  sources.  In  1985,  Africa  was  the
desti  nation  of  less  than  I % of  all  US private  foreign  investment  (UJS Department  of
Commerce,  1986).6  Thus  Coughlin  (1990:247)  records  significant  disinvestment  bY
US private  companies  from  Kenya  in  the  1980s.7
II.2  New  Forms  of  Investment  and  Equity  Sales
Since  the  nationalisation  "phase"  predominant  in  the  1965-75  period,  a  common
feature  of  private  capital  investors  has  been  to  seek  an  involvement  in  African
business  which  earns  income  with  only  a  minimum  commitment  of  equity  capital.
Until  the  deep  recession  of  the  early  1980s,  governments  frequently  co-operated
with  this  approach  - in  fact  it  was  often  a  necessary  consequence  of  the
nationalisation  of  a  major  enterprise  if  there  was  to  be  any  continuity  in  its
management.  Such  income  could  be  generated  from  management  agreements,  patent  and
technology  licensing  agreements,  production-sharing  contracts,  and  international
subcontracting.  These  have  been  christened  "new  forms  of  investment"  (NFI)  by  the
OECD Development  Centre  (Oman,  1984  and  1989).  This  categorisation  is  based  on  a
perception  of  them  as  embodying  "capital"  (for  instance  in  the  form  of  accumulated
R  & D  expenditure)  which  is  then  applied  to  the  development  of  projects  in  which
the  equity  is  at  least  50%  locally-owned,  and  in  which  the  reward  paid  to  NFI  is
linked  to  the  profitability  of  the  enterprise  to  which  it  is  applied.  The
importance  of  NFI  in  SSA  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  in  Nigeria  various  forms  of
NFI-type  income  accounted  for  40% of  the  total  investment  income  paid  overseas  from
1976-86,  a  figure  which  is  twice  the  OECD estimate  for  the  developing  world  as  a
whole  (Central  Bank  of  Nigeria  data  cited  in  Githongo  et  al.  1988).
6  The  fact  that  US  Department  of  Commerce  data  suggest  a  continued
expansion  of  investment  flows  to  Africa  in  the  early  1980s,  when  OECD data  show
a  severe  overall  contraction,  is  probably  yet  another  example  of  the  unreliability
of  the  data  on  investment  flows  to  SSA.
7  These  include  Firestone,  Bank  of  America,  First  National  Bank  of
Chicago  and  the  American  Life  Insurance  Company.16
One reason  why NFI have grown in importance  has been the  perceived riskiness
of the economic environment in most African countries.  Another, quite distinct,
reason  reflects the  trend for  multinational  companies in  both the  food  and minerals
sub-sectors to diversify and to become purchasers, processors and distributors,
rather than merely the producers of a commodity.  In this case, their interest in
Africa as a product source is dependent both upon the cost levels prevailing in
Africa compared to other parts of the world, and the minimum amount of capital
which they  need to commit.  As a consequence  of both th,se factors, NFI-type deals
will remain of great interest to potential overseas partners, and today there is
frequently an NFI component to most new investments.
Foreign  investors  in  Africa  have  for  long  co-existed  with  local
entrepreneurs, but have  seldom actively assisted  in their development through
purchasing a certain minimum of inputs from them.  Exceptions to this are, on
the one hand,  the building industry and, on the other, the system of contract
growing,  often linked to  nucleus  estates  and  always to  processing  plants,  practised
by  a number of agribusiness companies, particularly in eastern Africa.  These
resemble the contract growing systems developed by multinational companies  in
central and south America over the last forty years: in Africa they have their
roots in the Gezira Board of the Sudan (established in 1923), and the rice and
cotton buying state-owned companies of the northern savanna belt of Francophone
west Africa (such as SEMRY in Cameroon, and Office d-i  Niger in Mali).
In 1990, the most impressive  "portfolio" of such projects is certainly that
of the UK Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC)  which has a financial stake
(in the form of both equity and loan capital) in 15 such projects in SSA.  These
include the Smallholder Coffee Authority in Malawi, which provides services to
4,000 growers, the Kenya Tea Development Authority, which supports over 150,000
small farmers, and the Mumias Sugar Company in Kenya, which supports over 30,000
"outgrowers".
Mumias, however, is  one  of the few  such  projects to  have been partly financed
by equity capital supplied by an offshore private investor, 8 as distinct from a
development finance agency.  Developed  as a pilot project in  1964, it was expanded
to a commercial scale in 1969, and its  outgrowers now produce over two mn tons of
8  In this case Booker Tate of the UK, which provided about 4% of the
original paid up share capital.1/
cate, arid  200,000 tons  of  sugar  per  year.  The  area  farmed  by  outgrowers  varies
from 0.25 ha to 10 ha; the company provides working capital to cover planting and
growing costs, wlhichi  are deducted from the price for-  sugar cane offered at the
factory gate.  Under an NFI-type arrangement, Booker Tate provides a technicai
assistance contract  which is  performance-related,  but  now involves  no  more than  one
or two personnel on a permanetit  basis.  Two  further examples of the "contract
grower"  approach  are provided  in Kenya by thie  Njoro Agricultural  Company,  which  has
over 2,000 growers packing lhat-icot  beans for export, and British  Anerican Tobacco
(BAT),  which processes t.obacco  for the  domestic market and purchases it from over
10,000 outgrowers.
II.3  Structural Adjustment and Foreign Direct Investment
During the course of the 1980s, increasing numbers of SSA countries have
adopted structural adjustment  programmes (SAPs).  In this  section  we first  briefly
survey the overall costs and benefits of FDI, especially in the era of falling
foreign investment inflows,  and then  highlight some more specific issues directly
and indirectly related to foreign investment arising from SAPs.
II.3.1  Costs and Benefits of FDI
Foreign investment  brings to  an economy a range of potential  benefits.  For
SSA the main ones (although  not applicable to all investments)  would include the
following: an expansion in productive and technological capacity, an increase in
skill levels  and employment, lower  foreign  exchange costs  of  goods now  produced  and
previously  imported, and  an  increase in  foreign exchange  earnings  for  goods
exported.  Positive "second round"  effects would include the following: increased
local demand, and therefore a boost to further  production and an encouragement to
further foreign and domestic investment.  Foreign investment,  however, can also  be
a bearer of potential costs as well as benefits.
Estimates  of  the aggregate  impact of  FDI  on  the  economies of  SSA are
necessarily vague, partly as a result of lack of data.  Nonetheless, it would
appear that production directly attributable to foreign-owned  assets in the mid-
1980s contributed close to 20% of the GDP of many African economies.  This is
significantly lower than the comparable figure for the 1960s and early 1970s, in18
large  part  as  a  result  of  the  nationalisations  of  fo,vcign  capital  carried  out
sillc(e  that time.  In  the  case  of  Nigeria,  the  conitribution  of FDI  to  G;DI)  fell  iroim
about  40%  in  1976  to 20%  in  1986.  Yet  in  the  case  of  other  counitries,  such  as
(;ahon  and 3otswana,  the  figure  remains  much  h'gher.
This  relatively hiigh  and continuinig  contributioni  of F'DI  to growtlh,  however,
has  i ncreasinogly  tended  to  he  at the  expense of negative flows on the halance of
paymentts.  With  the  exception  of'  mineral  extraction  and  agricultural  plantation
investment  geared  to  exporting,  most  FDI  lhas  been  concentrated  in  import
substituting industries. Although this  was designed to  replace imported  products,
most  import-substituting  industries  have  in  turn  had  a  high  ratio  of  imported  to
total  material  inputs.  Thus  in  Nigeria  in  the  mid 1970s,  the  ratio  of  imports  to
total industrial supplies was about 90% for five major-  industrial sub-sectors,
ranging from  agricultural  machinery fabrication to textiles (Onimode  et  al., 1983,
chapter 3).  In  C6te d'Ivoire in 1975, in the case of seven out of 15 categories
of  enterprise  where  FDI exceeded  50%  of total production, the  value of imports  was
greater than the value added within C6te d'Ivoire (Mansini et al_, 1979).
Once a certain and substantial stock of  foreign investment  committed  to
import substitution on this  basis has been established and exports remain minimal
or non-existent,  it is inevitable  that  FDI  will generate  net costs in terms  of the
current account of the  balance of payments.  Further, the evidence in  SSA suggests
that it  is  very unlikely .hat  inflows  on capital account, in  the form  of new equity
investment,  will offset these negative outflows other than for an initial period
and in exceptional  years.  It may, of course,  be argued that in the absence of the
import  substituting FDI, the  volume of imported  goods  would be greater and so this
type  of  investment  simply  substitutes  one  type  of  foreign  exchange  outlay
(repatriated investment income) for another (imported consumer goods).  Yet the
high  dependence  of  most  import  substituting  industrialisation  on  imported
intermediate  goods  means that  in  practice there  has  been a twofold  foreign  exchange
cost in terms of both investment income and imported inputs.
C6te d'Ivoire  provides a good  example of the  balance of payments problems of
an  accumulated  stock  of  such  foreign  equity  (Riddell, 1990a in Riddell et al.,
1990c):
In  everv  vear  from  1965-84.  the  outtlow  of profits,  dividends  and
reirnlances  exceeded  the  inflow  of  privat-  capital,  quite
dramaticallx'  so in the post 1975 period.  Indeed in the more
recent 1975-1984 period, this outflow totalled Fr. CFA 1.1 bn,l  ,  '!  Co.  t  I  a  t  I  ex::  I'  td  Ivn  i I  S  :,!  .. :.  .;.;: '11  I  cit  or  han  t  )  li
ot  ai  1  1W  I I)!  pr(  v .I  (  i.i)  It  . i  Ix  ;;r  nX  <  f  roi.n
I h)  .)  - (LIven  w  I t  Io(  it  tl  ht  r  )  c;  1 1  i,  (l;t  l  0  6'  1  ()  I  re:i  t t ance
tai:nt  ts  ,  h(le  IIt  (!  t  tct  (i  p1  v.'  e  ( .a-II  .i  t  l  In  ows,  whell
Coiuint  r  balanced  1)h'  prof  it  and  di  vi  dlend  otJtf  low,  onlv  assisted
tle halanct  of  paNvnientts  ini  e if,It  years  ott  oi  210  tfro  1965-84.
nve(r  tjle  en r itre  period  1965-85,  thero  was  a  net  out  i  low  of  Fr.
(FA  100  bn,.
Similarly in Kenya from 1981 to 1988, one source, based on official figures, has
suggested  that  time  not  inflow of long-term  capital  (inicludiing  reinvestment)  slowed
to a total  of K£20 mn:  but with an outflow  of international  investment  income (from
previous inflows)  of KF1,325 mn, there  was a net total outflow of over KE1,300 mn,
equivalent to $1./5 bn (Coughlin in  Riddell, 1990c:245-6).
Besides  the  foreign exchange  ii.ipact,  there  is  the  question  of  skills
transfer.  There  is no doubt that the impact of  FDI on  the overall  level of
technical skills in the community is difficult to assess.  Yet, given the normal
turnover in an  industrial labour force, one indicator of the impact of FDI on
technical skills would be the size of the  workforce in enterprises where FDI has
a controlling interest.  In fact the aggregate numbers employed in this sector
are quite modest.  For  instance, in  1985 in Kenya,  foreign-owned enterprises
employed about 7% (82,000) of the 1.1 mn formal sector employees (Government of
Kenya, Economic Survey 1987:41).
However this  apparently fairly low number  of directly  employed  wage earners
is  offset in  Kenya, as elsewhere,  by se%eral  other considerations (see  King, 1977).
First, the normal turnover of this labour force is sufficient to ensure that a
certain proportion, with varying levels of skill, is distributed throughout the
informal sector, as  well as  being available to  new corporate enterprises.  Second,
many of the materials  with which informal  sector  entrepreneurs  work, such as scrap
metal, textile  waste and timber, are recycled - often illicitly - from large scale
industry.  Third, many of the self-employed "informals"  continue to  work in formal
sector industry  for several  months at  a time,  when labour  requirements  are  highest.
Fin<,fly,  much of  the construction industry depends on formal sector companies
subcontracting at least half of a total work programme to informal contractors,"  (I
wI.ilIv  ot  t'i I oin  ill  tUrI  tIII  t  to  n]  p)  o(dti  e  d  1,'  01  her  Ii:til,n,  i-;  (of  f  the  !;(If-employed
w(,ikforc-.'
(!i  the  ot her  h and,  thle  impact  of  F)D1  on thle  developii.lnt  of  nana gement  skills
Wi  lliiii  enterprises  has  tiot  been  particularlylV  favourable.  In  19/1  in  Kenya,  only
23%  of  executive  ot  managerial  posts  in  all  U.S.  owned  companies  were  held  by
Kenvan  citizenis  (Nzoimo. 1911),  while  by  1982,  less  tlhanii  60%  of  maniagers  and
administrators in  the  entire (foreigin-dominated)  manufacturing sector  were Kenyans
(Kim, 1985:23).  In 1978, in C6te d'Ivoire only 34% of senior posts  were held by
Ivorians,  while even at the level  of skilled artisans 30% o' the posts were still
held by expatriates (Campbell, 1983).  Although the process of indigenisation  of
skills has advanced  in the intervening decade in some countries, many African
executives of companies effectively controlled  by FDI still do not have a sense  of
taking responsibility for major decisions.  What  is more,  1984 data for C6te
d'Ivoire (published in 1988) reveal that lvorians  constituted only 51% of senior
personnel in industry,  and they  were in a majority in only 6 out of 16 industrial
sub-sectors (Ministere  de l'Industrie, 1988).
In summary, therefore, caution has to be exercised in assuming that the
intended  benefits of FDI on the economies of SSA have arisen in practice.  Whilst
making  an important contribution to growth, FDI has  frequently had  a negative
impact on the balance of payments, made only a modest contribution to generating
employment,  and  done  much  less  than  it  could  to  develop  a  cadre  of  local
executives.
II.3.2  Disappointment in the Short Term
The  long-term objective of structural adjustment programmes  (SAPs) is to
raise the productive  capacity of  the economy  through both macro-economic and
institutional  intervention. Such intervention  is  intended  to  create an  environment
in which both domestic and foreign private investment  can flourish.  Yet in  he
9  Yet  even within  the Kenyan  experience the evidence  appears to be
contradictory.  Thns,  in  a  study  of  20  subsidiaries  of  foreign  companies,
Gershenberg (1983:21,31) reported that "in no case did we find firms undertaking
to  assist in the  development of local suppliers",  and concluded that "subsidiaries
of multinationals,  while not opposed to  using  local  sources,  ncither seek out local
suppliers nor do they contribute to the development of local sourcing".21
short,  or  even  meditim  term,  the  evidonce  mggests  thar  it  i; uinlikely  that  the
typical  SAP  "package'  wi  1  lhai.'e  an  overa  l1 incent  ive  ef ff'ct  on  FD)I  - even  if it may
be positive  in thle  lonrer term.
Concern about  the short-term eff?cts of  SAPs  on  FDI  lhas  been  reflected
recenitly  in  the International Finance Corporation's  (IFC's) Annual  Report  for
1989,  which comments thus (IFC, 1989:23):
A  number  of  African  countries  lhave  embarked  on  economic  and
instituitional  reforms.  These reform progra,wnes  often make the
business environment  more difficult in the short to medium term
by  introducing  the  need  to  adapt  to  more  competitive
circumstances.  Furthermore,  measures  aimed at reducing  deficits
often result in restrained overall demand and depressed local
markets. Many businesses find it difficult to adjust to trade
reforms and  industrial restructuring measures  and  to absorb
increased input and debt service costs caused by local currency
devaluations.  In this kind of environment, investors adopt a
wait-and-see attitude  before  making  new investments  or expanding
operations.  In  the long term, however,  the success of such
reforms should increase  the  scope  for  private sector  activity.' 0
The potentially unattractive character of SAPs to FDI (in the short term)
can  be  seen  from  a  breakdown  of  the  key  components  of  typical  adjustment
programmes.  These have included the following:
*  the rem( al of import  quotas;
*  tariff reduction;
*  the introduction of positive "real" interest
rates;
*  a revision of energy prices;
*  a revision of agricultural prices;
*  an  introduction  of  energy  conservat,on
measures;
*  a revision of industrial incentive schemes;
*  introduction  of  policies  to  increase  the
efficiency of public enterprises;
10  In its 1990  Annual Report, similar  comments are made about the negative effects
of structural adjustment  policies for investment in  the short term,  as well as the
hoped-for revival in the longer term IFC (1990:19).ilnpl1oviI,  stIp  ort  i olr  agri  (' t  tre  (I  ii'bt  i
et'.
*  i  pimroving  siipport  lor inidust  ry alld  sub  -seVCtors
(iclI  udinlg  thIie  removal  of price con  t  rols).
hllis  Ii  s t  excludes  depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate,  wlichl  has  been  a
C(omMno  f eature  of  most  structural  adjustment  lending  packagpes,  and  some
d evaluatio  ns  have  been  severe  in  the  extreme.  Thus  in  (;hana  the  value  of  US$1
fell from three to 30  Cedi in  1982-3,  the  value  of  the  Tanzanian  shilling  fell  by
over a half in 1985/6, Sudan devalued by 40% in 1984/5, and in Zambia, US$1 fell
from 2.74 kwacha in 1985 to 16 by October 1989.  A "one-off" devaluation  would be
an encouragement to foreign investment.  In  practice, however, even in cases  where
devaluations have been quick and severe, they  have often been followed  by further
depreciations of the currency.  Such action and uncertainty encourages potential
investors  to  continue  to  wait  for  further  falls  in  currency  value  before
committing their funds.
A reduction in protection in import substituting industries through lower
tariffs is likely to result in lower sale. on the domestic market and, especially
if  this  occurs,  a  squeeze  on  profit  levels  of  relatively  uncompetitive
manufacturing enterprises.  Significant depreciation of the exchange rate makes
imported inputs  more expensive,  while the  upward movement of interest  rates tends
to erode the opportunities for cheap local  borrowing, which has been convenient to
many  offshore  investors.  An  increase in energy prices,  and  in the price  of
transport  and other services,  has the  same adverse effects on current and expected
profit flows.
Cdte d'Ivoire provides one, important, 1' example of how such conditionality
has been applied at the level of an individual country.  The key elements of the
package lying behind three SALs  made to Cdte d'Ivoire in the 1980s have been:
(a)  a reduction in tariffs,  with the objective of creating a uniform 40%
across-the-board tariff;
(b)  the  abolition  of  quotas  on  imports  and  of  valeurs  mercuriales
(additional  ad valorem taxes);
Ii  Important  both because much time and care have been taken  by the Bank
in  designing the policies for  C6te  d'Ivoire, and  because of the length  of time that
SAPs have been in operation in that country.(c  t he  i nt roduc I ion  of  ac ross  - t he -board  expo)rt  i Tice  t i ye  t  (')0'lot e ract
the  new  tari  ff  regiine  azid  the  ef  f ect  of  t li  h  igh  i calI  exchanp,ge  rate
resu1  t ing  f rom  membe rsi  i p  of  ,he  f ranc  zone  ;  aid,
(d)  a  revisionl  of  the  investmlent  code,  iiwc luI(tig  spec  i  icall  y  t le
abolition  of  tariff  exemptions  Ior  priori  t !  f irns,  anid  the  revision
of  certain  fiscal  measures  (suIcth  as  the  exten-sion  of  VAT zo  the  first
processing  of  raw  materials).
In  the  years  1981-88,  net  FDI  Into  Cote  d'  Ivoire  (Oargely  reinvestment  of
existinig  companies)  totalled  $295  mn  ($37  inn a  year),  coimipared  with  $425  mn  ($53
inn  a  year)  in  the  period  1973-80  (IMF,  1989:310-311  and  World  Bank  1989c:112-113).
This  is  not  to  argue  that  it  was  the  structural  adjustment  prograins  whirhi  were  the
cause  of  the  drop  in  foreign  investment  - clearly  the  issues  were  far  more
complex.  Nor  is  it  being  suggested  that  the  marked  contraction  in  foreign
investment  inflow  would  have  been  reversed  if  these  policies  had  not  been
followed:  the  aggregate  trends  could  have  been  equally  as  adverse.  Rather  it  is
to  suggest  that  the  climate  of  1980s,  to  which  structural  adjustment  programs  made
a  significant  contribution,  was  such  as  not  to  encourage  the  further  inflow  of
private capital.
Broadly,  the  reaction  of  most  holders  of  FDI  already  in  Africa  to  SAPs  has
been  primarily  one  either  of  "wait  and  see"  or  of  withdrawal.  Bennell's  study  on
British  investment  in  the  industrial  sub-sector  reveals  substantial  withdrawal,
while  a  recent  survey  of  French  investors  already  present  in  Africa  revealed
little  enthusiasm  for  expansion  (West  Africa,  11  June,  1990).  Both  aggregate  and
country-specific  data  suggest  at  best  a  slowing  of  foreign  investment  inflow,  at
worst  a  net  outflow.  On  the  other  hand,  the  programmes  put  in  place  in  the  1980s
have  generated  a  substantial  interest  within  the  international  private  sector  in
short-term  trading  deals,  which  take  advantage  of  the  relative  freeing  of  the
niarket  in  foreign  exchange.  Overall,  however,  and  to  date,  whilst  SAPs  may  have
certainly  encouraged  certain  types  of  short-term  international  private  sector
operations,  they  have  not  reversed  the  ovetall  trend  to  d&sinvestment,  and,  in
certain  instances,  may  have  accelerated  it.  Perhaps  the  classic  c'ase  is  Ghana,
where  there  has  been  minimal  new  foreign  investment  irterest  after  the  country  has
pursued  one  of  the  most  vigorous  structural  adjustment  programrme  in  the  whole  of
Africa,  and  one  in  which  foreign  investor  involvement  had  been  expected.2 4
Wthat  remains uncertain is  whether further  attempts to  address the particular
problems of the  Af'rican  economies - s,lch  as the over-extended state,  bureaucratic
ineff'iciencies,  a  wide  range  of  administered  controls,  financial  and  other
infrastructural  constraints - will eventually lead to the  anticipated injection  of
new capital or not  Certainly such reforms  considered in isolation  should attract
foreign investment.  But there are othier  issues which  foreign investors will
consider.  For  the  primary  sectors,  and  especially  for  import-substitutinp,
ventures,  there would  appear  to be  little optimism: given  the macro-economic
objectives of SAPs, it remains difficult to see how their main content can be
preserved  but their  disincentive to  FDI offset.1 2 For  export-oriented industries,
however, there would appear initially to be some grounds for greater optimism.
Although to date the overall impact of new foreign investment in these areas has
not been marked, it is possible to rccord some successes.  These would include,
for instance, fishing, poultry and plastics ventures in the Gambia, and cext!les
in  Lesotho.  Further,  a crucial element in the decision to invest is the  potential
investor's overall assessment of the country in question.  The short term impact
of SAPs in small, low-income countries is now well defined.  The total effect
tends  to  create  an  image  of  unstable  prices  and  a  changing  institutional
environment in which  it is adivisable  to exercise caution.  The prevalence of
capital flight amongst those  with saving reinforces this image.  If a decision to
support a project  is taken, the preference will be  for a minimal  involvement
through one of the various forms of NFI.
Two  worries  persist,  however.  The  first  is  tLnat  subscantial  export
successes have also been recorded in  countries in which formal SAPs have not been
adopted, as the examples of a wide range of companies in Zimbabwe and the INDECO
group in Zambia testify.  1
3 The second is both more general and more serious.
Recent studies in foreign investment in developing countries suggest that a low-
wage regime is  a far less important incentive  for location in a developing country
than in the past.  As Lutkenhorst (1988) comments:
12  In Ghana,  money  supply  restraints prescribed by  the  IMF  to curb
inflation  have had an impact  but at least initially  led to shortages of liquidity,
affecting at least domestic investment in manufacturing.
13  INDECO's  exports in  1989  totalled $32  mn.  For details  of the  expansion
of Zimbabwe's manufactured exports see Riddell (1990b).Key  factors  in  st  eering  what  has  become  a  t lhinnler-  Ilow  of  FDI  to
developitng  count  ries  are  skill  levels,  market  size,  the existeence  of
ani  efficienit  industrial support  network,  the  availability  and  qua]it  v
of  various  stupport  services  as  well  as;  advan  ed  telecounuinication  and
information  -processing  facilities.  Whereas  previoislyv  a  certain
phlysical  i nf ras  t ruc  ture  (t  ranisport  f ac i I i t i es,  energy  anid  wa t er
suipply)  was  often  stufficient  to  attract  VI1.  niow  a  hlighllv  developed
hlumani and  technological  infrastructunre  won ld  appear to  be  reqtuired.
What this  suggests is that the  presence of a stable (and  expanding) domestic
industrial  base tigether  with access to if not a domestic thani  at least  a reliable
regional market  are  becoming  increasingly  important  factors  in decisions  of
foreigners to  re-locate into  developing countries.  This provides a counter to the
view that investors are likely to be attracted in significant num.bers  solely to
invest in industries geared to the export market, even if they have in the past.
There are other new features of foreign investment  to  which reference  should
also  be  made.  For  instance  much  has  been  made  in  the  literature  of  the
opportunities presented  through the offering  for sale of  state or parastatal
enterprises.  Much  more pub'icity has been  given, however,  to the "for sale"
notices 14 than to the evidence of "sale completed":  foreign investors have, in
general, not  been particularly attracted  by this new  area of involvement,  aithcugh
examples of new foreign involvement would include bottling companies in Guinea,
14  Ghana, for instance, has named over 30 domestic companies for which
it has sought foreign purchasers.  In March 1990, Nigeria named 67 companies,
while, in the last few years, other offers have included the following:
Togo  -steel, textiles, oil, agricultural implements, plastics,
marble;
Liberia  -oil refining (in  some doubt);




Sudan  -agriculture, manufacturing (announced  June 1988);
Liberia  -petroleum refining;
Cameroon  -banana plantation;
Ghana  -palm oil;
Rwanda  -matches;
Guinea  -soft drinks.2 6
rai  Iwatvs  and sisal plaitat.ions  in  TaiizaIi  a a  id  cott  on in MozaInh i (ue  Perhaps  the
earliest example of state "sell-offs" t.o  the private sector was  tlhlt  of Togo.  Of
the 19  enterprises  originally earmarked for  state  divestment tlhe  early 1980s, five
had still not.  been disposed of by October 1990.  Of those that  have been sold off,
some certainly have been the subject of foreign interest, although it has been
usual  for  this  involvement  to  be  married  with  substantial  aid  finance  and
internationial  finance  corporations.  S  The plastics  company Industric-  Togolaise des
Plastiques was still failing to make a profit tlhree  years after new ownership and
radical re-organisation, while the Kara plant of the Industrie Textile Togolais
and Togotex was stand.ng idle in  May 1990  after re-purchase "as a virtual gift"  by
a liong  Ko.lg  investor after the original Spanish and then Korean investors pulled
out  (West Africa,  11 June, 1990).  Even the so-called success story, Societe
Togolaise  de  Siderurgie  (STS), was  operating  in  a  far  from  internationally
competitive environment: behind tariff protection of 4,%.
One of the  main purposes of the  move to privatisation has been to raise the
efficiency of state or state-related operations.1 6 In these cases, the capital-
supplying role of foreign investment is less crucial.  In some circumstances,
where either the foreign  partner or the  government  have not been in favour  of full
privatisation, other modes of involvement have occurred.  For instance, Booker
Tate has  indicated its preference for management agreements with fees fixed in
relation to levels of output and/or exports.  Za re is an example of a country
which arranged management contracts for its airline, copper and gold mines, after
failing to attract equity patticipation.
15  Nioto, the country's food oil production companiv,  was sold in 1987,
with 51% of its shares going to the French CFDT.  Much of the initial CFA 6 bn
investment came from French aid funds, although in this case there has been a
marked improvement in production.
16  One needs, however, to be wary about  making a  priori  judgements about
tlle  absolute  efficiency  of private  over  public  enterprises, or  the  relative
efficiency of foreign over domestic capital.  In a recenit  studv, Grosh (1990)
provides evidence to suggest that in Kenya's manufacturing sector, public and
quasi-public firms perform bettelr  than private firms, while a World Bank study
(1989d:35) in Zimbabwe reveals a hipher rate of return on equity from local than
foreign companies.Ai  t lit  I  i  t  t  *  t,  ',  al  ¾.  lv  r  i' *.x  ill'.,'-  i'm  1  iI  ",sic  puI  I s  of  Africa  to
t  *4-  *'.'  r  tIe  ii  . IIti  t  i  lit'  W)  oth  t  I'  .dmo WI  ,h  t(  witIIitI.,iw  Aai  iij,  put)licity  for
t 1  i s  I)ll  lo(l  eIli'I  de,d';  to  he  I aii  d  i  I (  i  klk'i  thti  (luv!,t  io0  f  }h(e  the(-  there  has  been
,V  ftlw  (qU  i  t v  i flt  lOW.  Ci  t ai  Ill  v there are  (xampl]  es of  f  ore  i  gi exchange  gain
t  hrou.nh expallkid(  export  and  of  expandef(  dlOltst  i c  i  tveit;  m.ent  sulvSequent  to  the
takeover  . Th11,,  followil  ig  the $14 iDl  pulrcliase  1(  1livine  Industri  eS  by  H.J. Heinz
in  . Zimhahw  in  1982,  Heinz  announced  in  1988  i::  pl  aris  to  increase-  its investment
to  Z$260  mn bv  19  94.  Most.  of this, however.  ,1s  nvestilient  from  its  Zimbabwe
dolllar earnings.
Finallv, much publicity has also been given to the new phenomenon of debt-
equity swaps.  These have spread  to such an extent  in recent years that one
commenitator  (Parhizgari, 1988) has claimed that "today, most corporations that
wish to invest in debtor nations can do so by buying debt for investment at a
discount"  (Page  and  Riddell,  1988).  Debt-equity  swaps have  certainly  been
important in some  Latin American countries.  The much smaller  weight of commercial
debt in African liabilities has, however, limited their applicability to African
countries, and even countries such as Nigeria, which hdve attempted to pursue
debt-equity packages, have been singularly  unsuccessful.
11.3.3  Improvements to the "Enabling Environment"
Just as it  would be erroneous to conclude that  no new investment had flowed
to SSA during the 1980s, so too it would be incorrect to argue that the macro-
picture  reflected  a  backdrop  of  policy  inactivity  or  hostility  to  foreign
investment. As the following  paragraphs indicate,  significant  policy changes  have
been occurring, especially in the post-1983 period, which together have improved
17  Instances of TNC replacement investment would include Norsk Hydro's
1988 investment in the fertiliser industry in Zimbabwe replacing South Africa's
African Explosives and Chemicals Industries (AECI), Lonrho's participation with
the government for the purchase of Consolidated Textiles, also in Zimbabwe, the
purchase by Rh6ne Poulenc Sante of France of  West German interests in the Societe
Industrielle Pharmaceutique  de l'Ouest  Africain in  Senegal  and the  purchase by the
Netherlands' Billiton International Metals of an 80% stake in the Twangize gold
deposits  held  by  Belgium's Societe Miniere  &  Industrielle du  Kivi  in Zaire.
Additionally, there  have been opportunities for foreign firms  to take over all or
part interests in local  private companies, as happened for instance in early 1988
when DAF Trucks of the Netherlands took up shares in Kabwe Transport in Zambia.,' 8
t!,¢  o(r,  1-  c I im,  ei:  e  idl  pot  e Int i a IoI  forlt.  i g;[ I ivest  IenIt  .Many  of  these have been
kiii(itt  itkeji  ill  t,  e  coit  ext  (if  SAIP;.
The  1(J8(0S  . It  I( part  i (u0 Iarlv  the  last  six  vears,  have  wi  nessed  two  important
iIld  Ci  1  elrat  di  Chalg(  S  iTi  SSA.  First,  ,rowinrg  foreign  g-xchange  shortages across
the  ('Oll  inlent  brough  t  to  prominenice  in  the  eves  of policy makers  in Africa the
;idlvala  gte  FDI brings,  in  the  form  hoth  of  increased  inflow  of  foreign  exchange  from
the initial investment  and of the earnings of export-orie;ited  enterprises, where
relevant.  Thlis  in  turn  led  increasing  miwnbers  of  governmen-s  to  reduce  or
elimitnate  the hostility towards foreign  companies  which mainy  had cultivated in the
post-Independence period.1 8 These moves, hlowever,  need to be placed in the wider
international context.  Thus,  in general,  Latin American  and Asian countries
began to end their controls or restrictions on FDI in 1976-7, well before the
second oil price  rise, or  the recession of  1980-2 and  the debt and financing
crises,  supporting  the view  that  the need  for  foreign exchange  was  not  the
principal motive for their  change in policy.1 9 The fact that other countries  have
also changed their policies - and in many cases earlier than in Africa - must,
therefore, diminish the impact of the African changes, especially as the 1980s
have  also  seen  a  marked  fall  in  net  private  investment  flows  to  Latin  America  (see
Table 2).
Nonetheless,  two  specific  types  of  policy  change  towards  FDI  can  be
highlighted.  First  has  been  the  decision  to  participate  ,n international  investor
insurance schemes, specifically through signing agreements promoted by the US'
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), or the joining of organisations,
such  as  the  Multilateral  Investment  Guarantee  Agency  (MIGA).  As  the  former,  in
particular,  is  seen  as  a  sine  qua non  for most US  investors to  look at all
favourably at a country, it forms an important part of the perception potential
investors  have  of  Africa  and  particular  African  countries.  Almost  all  African
18  In  the post-independence years, Ghana,  Guinea, Nigeria,  Tanzania,
Zaire and Zambia introduced restrictions on the access of foreign investment to
some  sectors,  while  price  controls,  labour  legislation  and  foreign  exchange
restrictions all affected foreign investors  particularly strongly.
1  9  It  is not  being  argued here  that  all  Asian  countries have  been
welcoming to foreign investment.  Besides the obvious  examples of China and India,
Indonesia, for instance, has severe restrictions on the sectors in which foreign
companies mav operate.9
countries  have  now  become  ;ignatories  (of  (OPl  C;  the  ineinbership  of  the  more
recently formed MIGA remains sinaller,  while  it  is still  premature  to  assess  its
impact.  Second, increasing  numbers of African ca)untries  have either introduced  or
made substantial  changes to their investmetnt  codes and/or-  guidelines which  provide
both the initial entry point and overall framework for doing,  business in these
countries.  A  major  component of  these changes has  involved speeding up  the
decision-making process, often with the introductioni  of a "one-stop" investmenit
centrt
Between  1982 and  1987 more  than one  third of  African  countries either
introduced or made  adjustments to their investment codes or guidelines  (often
adopted in the period of post-independence  hostility to TNCs) in order to attract
foreign investors.  Four recent examples of countries with already considerable
foreign  investment are Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe.  In January  1989,
Nigeria announced radical changes in laws affecting foreign investment, reversing
the indigenisation  decrees of 1972  and 1977.  Foreigners  are now allowed to be the
sole  investor  in  all  enterprises with  the  exception  of  banking,  insurance,
petroleum  prospecting  and  mining.  In April  1989  Zimbabwe  launched  its new
investment  guidelines, 20 while in  July 1989  Kenya's Investment Promotion  Centre  was
overhauled. 2 1 Even those countries with a reputation for hostility to private
foreign investors, such as Mozambique and Guinea, have introduced  new legislation
offering a wide range of guarantees and opportunities for foreign investors.
While  in each country these moves have been heralded as significant, it
still remains doubtful whether these maves are in themselves sufficient to result
in  a major inflow of new foreign investment.  In Nigeria, for instance, the  decree
(number 54  of 1989) giving the details of the new moves on foreign investment  does
not permit foreign companies registered under the old decrees (of 1972 and 1977)
to increase their levels of foreign  holdings; most were fixed at a maximum.  of 40%.
What is more,  informed Japanese opinion in early 1990 (from the Institute for
International  Trade and lnvestment)  remained  of the view that  Nigeria still  had to
improve its investment incentives to "bring them in line with those prevailing
20  Zimbabwe  produced  two  publications:  The  Promotion  of  Investment:  Policy
and Regulations and the Investment Register.
21  This followed the launch of a new publication The Investor's Guide to
Kenya.Cl}
WI  I-:(,  ithtlIe(  wor  (I" (repor,t  in  thIe  fAt  I I ik  Ero nFom.ii  Di_-'  t  V,  1hruarv,  1990).
A  ,  i  .ifter  thei  "lew"  I i  vest  lleil t  codet  wa;  iilt  rodei  ed  iii  ;hana,  iln  1988,  it  was
illpprelt  t hat  it  s  provi)  i  ons  were  provilig  in.suf  fir  i  nt  Iv  atttract  ive  to  investors
di  1d  wokin  d  have  t O  he  amended  vet  again  - arn act  i .oi Ii  ke  I v  t O  i ns  t ill  further
caut  i on  into the ii  nds of po ent  ial investors  as w it  olg  could  lead  to even more
avXohII)  Lronlcess  ionls  heing wrung  from  the  authoi  it  ie'-;  - wliile  in  March 1990,  the
goex  I1enmt't  anlllouncd(  that company  tax  rates  woulId  hte  looered - again.  Both
foreignt  and domestic investors in  Zimbabwe have  been unanimous  in arguing that the
flew  guidelinles  on  thieir  own  are unlikely  to make  a  major  difference  to  the
decision of potential investors  to locate in the  country, while in  Kenya potential
investors  have expressed their fear that many of the proposals will remain on the
drawing  board,  typified  in  the  less-than-satisfactory manner  in which  price
control measures have been "liberalised".
Related to these measures have often been the introduction  or adaptation of
other complenientary  incentives designed to make the inflow of new private funds
more attractive, and to make it easier to utilise blocked funds for purposes of
reinvestment.  Such measures have  included incentives  traditional to  foreign
investment promotion  like tax holidays  (for up  to  10 years),  for example  in
Botswana, Lesotho and Mauritius, and removal of controls on remitting dividends,
or  a  relaxation  of  rules  on  retaining  export  income, as  has  occurred,  for
instance, in Nigeria, Mauritius and Zambia.
Of the many examples of the favourable  package of incentives now offered to
foreign investors in  SSA countries, t'¾e  following,  from Lesotho, are only typical
of the most favourable:
*  a ten-year tax  holiday, extendable for up to 15 years;
*  aui  advanced factory shell programme  which offers serviced
industrial buildings for immediate lease;
*  access to concessional loans at 11-13% interest;
*  access  to  foreign  exchange  and  the  repatriation  of
investment capital  and  earnings  (profits and  interest
subject to 15% and 10% withholding tax respectively);
*  a government sponsored skills training grant  which covers
up to 75% of the wage bill during the training phase;
*  rapid processing of permits for foreign skilled labour
required for the investment;31
an export financing  facility to  assist in  a]  Ieviat  lug  cash
flow prolblems  in  manufacturinig  for  exportt
These types of policy change need to  be viewed agaillst  the backdrop of the
macro-e(onomic  environment  and  overall  government/state  processes.  In  relation
to tthe  latter, investors are going to be interested in risking their funds only
in a country in which the claims of attractiveness are matched by action.  They
will thus look for consistency in the manner in which past investors have been
treated  vis  4i  vis  the  incentives offered,  as  well  as  the  speed with  which
applications have been processed.  As regards the inacro-enviroruinnt,  besides the
obvious  desire for  steady  growth  and a  history of  economic and financial  management
characterised by predictability, investors tend to view the relationship of the
host country with the International  Monetary Fund and the World Bank as a serious
litmus test of confidence. 22 For instance, in October 1987 the US corporation
H.J. Hleinz  finally decided not to -nvvest  in Zambia after that  country severed its
connections with  the Bank, even  though a memorandum of understanding had been
signed.23
Countries where notable inflows of foreign  private investment  have occurred
include  Togo, Gabon and  Mauritius - in the last  case the  number of firms  operating
in the Export Processing Zone has risen from 10 in 1971 to over 450 today.  While
recent changes  in policies have  been a factor here,  perhaps a more  important
consideration  has been long-term  consistency in  welcoming foreign investment.  In
other instances, more favourable policies in relation to particular sub-sectors
have led to inflows of foreign investment into these sub-sectors; this would be
true  for Ghana following  the introduction  (in 1986) of its  new  minerals investment
code.  It needs to be stressed, however, that although it is  usually necessary to
improve  both the  general  climate for  foreign investment  and the  range  of  particular
incentives in order to increase the inflow of foreign investment, it is not a
sufficient condition.
22  During  the 1980s,  some  35  African countries  embarked  upon Fund-assisted
adjustment  programmes,  yet less  than  a third "have  pursued their  adjustment  efforts
in a relativelv sustained manner" (Nsouli, 1989:33).
23  Heinz's  withdrawal  was  due  largely  to  the  breakdown  of  Zambia's
agreement with the IMF, particularly those aspects related to foreign exchange
allocation and price controls.  Earlier Zimbabwe lost a $9 mn investment in the
mining  sector in part because of unexpected changes in the labour laws (Baker,
1983:27-28).32
Oi.e  recent indicator of the effect of these new pol  icy initIatives on the
inflow of foreign investment is provided by the nuLnber  anid  type of new corporate
investmen1ts  supported by IFC in 1988 and 1989.  This is sumnarised in Table 4,
below.  The  figures appear  to  suggest  an  increased value  in  the  aggregate
investmnernts  supported.  However  in  1989,  a  single  investmenit  in  petroleum
extractionI  in  Gabon, with a valut of $747 mn, accounted on its own for 72% of the
total investmenit  figure.  If this  project is  rem  *ed  from  the list, the total  value
of inivestments  falls from $520.7  inn  in 1988 to $293  mn in 1989,  an(i  the proportion
in the primary, or extractive, sector rises from 51% to 57%.  On the other hand,
whilst the total number of projects fell between these two years, the number in
manufacturing - whilst very small in absolute terms - increased, if only from six
to eight.
Table 4
Corporate Investments in  Africa Supported by the IFC. 1988-9
1988  1989
No. of  No. of
Sector  ($  mn)  %  Projects  ($  mn)  X
Projects
A. Primary  273.3  51.7  11  916.6  88.1  7
B. Secondary  196.8  38.7  6  106.1  10.2  8
C. Tertiary  50.5  9.6  3  18.1  1.7  2
Totals  520.7  100.0  20  1,040.8 100.0  17
Source:  IFC Annual Report, 1988 and 1989.33
III.  PARTICULAR SUCCESSES AND PROBLEMS IN THE 1980s
III.1 Individual Examples against the Aggregate Trends
While  it  is  clearly  importaant  to  place  miijor-  emphasi!,  U1poI  hot  h  the  downward
trend  in  aggregate  foreign  investment  flows  to  SSA  and  the  increasing  divergence
between SSA and other regions of the developing world, it wotuld  be  erroneous  to
conclude that there had been next to no  new private investment within the sub-
re,ioni  in the previous decade.  On the  contrary, investments  by foreign companies
have been occurring throughout the 1980s, some of which have made a impact if not
upon a large  number of countries  of the sub-region,  then  at least  upon developments
within particular sub-sectors.
There are three sub-sectors which have been  the subject of particularly
visible attention by foreign private investors in the 1980s:  mining, agriculture
and the energy sector.  Interest in the mining sector, as would be anticipated,
has arisen  principally in  relation to  minerals in  which current and forecast  prices
are particularly buoyant.  Thus, foreign investors  have been most active in gold,
diamonds and platinum, with interest additionally spurred on by uncertainty about
the future of South Africa.  Substantial disinvestment by US  firms from South
Africa would appear to have had a positive impact on riiineral  investment in other
parts of Africa.24
It is important, however, to place even this range of new interests into
context.  A large proportion of these have been in connection with the "new forms
of investment" discussed in section I.2, above, or have taken place with "tied"
funds of companies already located in particular countries.  And even when new
money is anticipated, it can happen that the "investor"  delays committing equity
by subscribing convertible loan stock (for  example) rather than share capital.
A facilitative role in  promoting FDI has been played by, among others, the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the  Coimmonwealth  Development Corporation
(CDC),  the  Deutsche  Finanzierungsgesellschaft  fur  Beteiligungen  in
Entwicklungslandern (DEG),  the European Investment  Bank (EIB),  and the  US Overseas
Private  Investment Corporation  (OPIC).  A  whole  range  of  packages  has  been
24  Even  if those firms disinvesting from South  Africa have  tended to
leave the continent entirely rather than re-locate elsewhere on the continent.34
dtsiggned,  involving  one  or  more  of  the  following:  locaI  private  Investors,
governrflent  participation,  local  or  regional  bank  participatioon  all(  lthe  involvemenit
of  more  t  hali  onie  foreign  Investor, with invest  ment  or  imiiiag,ement  advice  from  the
Interinatiotial  agency.  In  some  instances,  the  choice  of  whether  to  place  equity
capital in  the venture can be delayed, thus miniimi  sing risk exposure even more.25
Some  recent  examples  of these sorts of  foreign investllent,  would  include the
UJtexafrica  textile  project  in  Zaire,  the  Lotirho/IFC  farm  projects in  Mozambique  and
the  palm-oil  refinery  in  Cameroon,  of  which the  main shareholder,  Soci.te National
d'Investissement (SNI) is  not  itself  contributing  financially.
In Zimbabwe, an injection of new funds into gold occurred at the start of
the decade, when RTZ invested $20 mn in the development of its Renco mine.  More
recently, the UK's Cluff Resources, having initially invested $1.7 mn  in gold,
injected (in early 1988) a further $8.3 mn into  gold projects. 26 There have, too,
been  instances of  re-investment and mineral exploration.27  In Ghana, United
States,  Australian, Canadian,  Irish  and  British (including  Cluff) interests  created
a mini gold rush in the country in the second half of the decade, with more than
50 prospecting and reconnaissance licenses taken out from 1986 to early 1988.
Guinea is  yet another country in which there  has been widespread interest in gold
25  Thus in  the IFC's  "guaranteed  recovery  of  investment  principal" (GRIP),
investors  can reclaim the  principal invested  from the IFC if  the project misfires,
or take on the investment  directly.
26  Cluff's African  investments have  clearly been  successful,  In the
words of the London Financial Times, they have "transformed the company from a
loss-making minor oil-company into a profitable medium-sized gold mining group"
(10 October, 1989).
27  For instance, Lonrho (UK) and the Anglo-American Corporation (South
Africa) have  both reinvested in  gold-mine  operations in  Zimbabwe, the  Anglo venture
being its first return to gold for over 20  years.  Exploration for new deposits in
the  country  has  been  undertaken  recently  by  Delta  Gold  and  Chase  Minerals
(Australia),  while RTZ announced in January 1989 that it would be spending US$16
mn (from  retained  earnings) on gold exploration in that  year.  Other international
companies which have shown recent interest in gold in Zimbabwe are: Australian
Seamet Mines and Consolidated Mining and Finance (Australia),  Atlantic Resources
and Kenmare Resources (Ireland) and Falconbridge (Canada).V)
itl  lr,ctiIt  Vt  .,  Il  Iowilig,  thIe  $13 0  inil  inivest  int  ill  the  Ared(tur  mi  Ie, (40% owned  by
the  Atistra  lii.sn  Biridg,e  Oil  groul .p
Ahullii;I(Ii  dllmoid  market,  toget  her  wit  II woories  about  South  African  supplies,
has  l((i  to  a  subst  ant  ial  expafnsion  of  product  ive capacity  duritng  the  1980s,
especial  lv  in  Botswana,  Ghana,  Namibia  anid  Zaire.  It  has  also  led  to  new
inve  t ment  s  bv  forei  gn  companies.  For  instance('  ,  tie  Aredlor  inine  in  Guinea,  which
went  into  pro0duction  in  198¶, was  by  1986  p)roducing  1.5%  of  the  world's  gem
diamonds  anid  receiving  the  higlhest  price  for  its  production  for  any  diamond  mine
in the world (Finanicial  Times, 9 November, 1988).
Considerable interest by potential investors in platinum is now leading to
major investment decisions being made.  The most significant here has been the
announcement in the second half of 1989  by the  Australian group, Delta Gold, that
its pre-feasibility study on the  viability of a US$160-200 mn platinum project on
the  Great Dyke in Zimbabwe  had proved encouraging, so  a full feasibility  study had
been commissioned, and the full project appears likely to go ahead. 29
Moving to agriculture, there is evidence of some new interest by private
foreign capital in a number of African countries during the decade, although very
little  of this  has involved  the initial injection  of new equity funds  from outside
Africa.  Major projects would include, for instance, Del Monte's participation in
the 1,500 hectare and $8.3 mn investment in bananas in Cameroon, 3 0 Lonrho's $7.4
mn investment to  develop tea estates in  Tanzania,  Aberfoyle Holding's  multimillion
dollar  Mwenezi investment in  palm oil in  Zimbabwe, and the 40,000 hectare palm oil
investment in  Ghana by four foreign companies, including Agricomo Oil Products of
Italy and Jamire Fats of Hungary.  In Zambia, several major  foreign investment
28  It was also the presence of diamonds at Aredor which stimulated the
interest of the Australians.
29  It is  estimated that 100,000 ounces  of metal could  be produced  a year,
and at full capacity the operation could in time rival production levels in South
Africa.  In a  separate development, a joint venture of Anglo-American  (South
Africa), RTZ and Robertson Mining Finance (UK)  was signed in May 1989, initially
to  commence a  US$2.5 mn exploration programme to extract some two mn tonnes of  ore
a year, while a third platinum investment project, put forward by Union Carbide
(USA), is  estimated  at US$120  mn, and includes  both a surface and  underground  mine,
producing eventually 5,640 kilogrammes of platinum a year.
30  Del Monte's interest is mainly in the form of working capital since
the land is rented.i ft
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Ct:}.nI  i I(d  wit  I  I  Wi Itj  tI I,Y  (f  I t ini  it t  oi(  ,  t ax  iiid  f orei  gil  (x  cXhaiiig  i ncett  ives  being
i'I  odtih  (Iti  hl(llid'lip  :  thtq  o)t  iot  oif purchias;  i;ig,  forve  i g  exh:iiyl,e  (  redits  of  othiel-
I(,  ii  j  1:  *  )i  iwitii  Fi  It  S  i  g lii  I ~t:t  i(  .,l  li (icouilt  s  f roio  thet-  cetit  r.I  hanIik.  *  Two  examples
4)t  Il  W  iit  :ign  iUnvetniet  %  it  wI  Oi Ii  he  MiSSt  OCk  of  I i-eland,  which  has  initiated  a  $10
:nt'  i%.'t-loot  akage  in  I  21,000)  beet  are  project  in  irrigated  cottotn  and  wheat
i;l-  t  ioIl,  whil  1  0  yital.  $)t)  ml)  packa pt:  in  the  west  of  the  coLunttry  has  been
ideti  '  k eli  bt  y  a  O  is  t  icoim  lIe aded  by  l.asco,  tthe  UK  subsi  diary  ot  the  US  Lumnius
IIIdSI'it1  ics.
The  energy  field  is  a  example  where  reports  of  foreigni  activity  need  to  be
put  into  some  perspective.  While  oil  and  gas  exploration  has  continued  in  the
198t)s,  in spite  of  the decline  in  international  oil  prices,  there  has  been  such  a
f.ill-off  in  foreigni  interest  that  exploration  activity  has  been  inadequate  for
Africa  to  maintain  its  share  of  world  production  in  the  1990s.  However  French,
United  States,  Spanish,  West  German,  Belgian,  Italian,  Japanese,  British  and  Irish
firms  have  been  particularly  active  in  response  to  projects  in  Angola  (offering
blocks  for  exploration  and  development),  Sudan  (on-shore  drilling),  Nigeria
(liquified  natural  gas  and  oil),  Gabon  (drilling  and  exploitation),  Equatorial
Guinea  (exploration  and  production)  and  Ghana  (recent  drilling).  There  has,  too,
been  Irish  investment  in  gas  in  Senegal  and  in  on-shore  oil  development  in  Gabon. 32
Besides  these  three  major  areas  of  activity  for  foreign  investors,  there
has  been  continuing  interest  in  hotels  and  tourism.  There  has  been  a  steady
increase  in  the  number  of  high-class  hotels  built  in  SSA  in  recent  years,  although
this  is  attributable  more  to  a  marked  expansion  in  worldwide  tourism  than  because
31  It  should  be  added,  however,  that  these  investments  have  also  arisen
in  part  because  of  the  existence  of  particularly  rich  and  unused  water  and  land
resources.
32  The  failure  of  Liberia  in  its  efforts  to  privatise  the  Liberia
Petroleum  Refining  Company  to  Link  Oil  International  of  Dallas  was  said  to  be  due
to  lack  of  government  guarantees.(  .t  k  *  I  i  IX  I  c  i  I  <Il  1;  .1-  i1  .}X.l  1.  ltI  i:  . . 5  . . .;!vl[  }  (v  l- .a
c o IoII  iii  c  aci t  i vi  t  v  i  11  t lit - . i  11(111  A  c  iii  . I..  ,  Inave  beeII
SIle-  art oIt,  lti  lt  o.I  I t  t  l1 - t  iIt  i  ielit  .X  I  i  il t  t  I  i  k't,,  h  A'cct,r  1,.  ..  t  t her  Wi  t  I  Hollyg
Kong  i nt  erest  s  inl  Maur it  ius i4  Iowe'vcr  1  lt IIf  i.yccl  Vc ii  Ct  cl  t.-.  C'ciil)lallies  has  been
Tin.St  IV  it  t he  f orin  of maI  iagepiieiit  c(Jiit  r aiikt  w  hot  c  *  (-  w-i  t  Xx i  itd  iii  Af  ri  c ai1  t hIe
1 980s  have  I  elied  liot  t  () hiV('  ten  I  iIt  Wi  t  i  O(cl Iit  V  I  -011O  II i-  (0-  ,  othIer  id(  ivid(ual
ititerliat  ional  equitv  sources.35  Linked  to  t he  (xpan!;ionn  of  ilit  ere;t  in  hiotels  has
beell  the  growt  h  i  in  safar  i  operat  ionq.  whichi,  since  at  I e;-  st  1  98  /  have  reported
record  levels  of  business.  Although  a  number  of  these  projects  have  included
foreign  partners,  they  have usually  not involved  large-scale  foreign investment.  36
An exceptiOnl  would  be  Kenya's  South  Korean-funded $40 mn Safari Park hotel, which
was completed in 1989.
Recent foreign interest in  manufacturing has been stimulat"'d  principally  by
perceived potential for exports,  spurred in  particular by preferential access to
international markets.  Besides the development of the export processing zone in
Mauritius, major investments have occurred especially in the textile industry,
although these  have largely  been funded from reinvested  profits or, in the case of
Lesotho  and  Botswana,  as  a result  of particular  and unique  circumstances  in
southern Africa.  Lesotho has certainly attracted new private capital from Hong
Kong,  Taiwan  and  South  Africa,  not  only  as  a  result  of  an  attractive  and
competitive investment climate  but because of the skilful marketing of the state-
owned Lesotho National Development Corporation, which has focused on preferential
access to the  European Community (EC),  US and  South  African markets.  The costs per
33  The  Harare-Sheraton,  however, (completed  in  the late  1980s)  was  planned
in large part in anticipation of its  use as a conference centre.
34  In August 1989 the $50 mn Bissau Sherato..  Hotel opened, bringing to
10 the number of hotels managed by Sheraton in  Africa.  The Gaborone Sheraton was
planned to  open in  1990, to  be followed  by one in  Mauiitius in  1991.  In September,
Yaound6's Hilton  International Hotel opened, with  Hilton International having
solely the management contract.
35  An exception is the announcement made in May 1990 that the Sheraton
Management Corporation was to take taken a (minor) equity share-holding in the
$50 mn Nairobi  Sheraton hotel.  This will be  the 12th hotel in Africa  under
Sheraton management.
36  Zambia Airways, for instance, operates a successful safari business
for foreign tourists, called "Africa Bound".o I,  t  I  . ;t  t  (l  ill  1,(  o  .,:  tl,  tww(w  ','  h-t"  .)  1.'  >t  (.1  1;l  I'l  "-.  I  II  l  't,  ,%I  I  i  (.e  (i,  Iltt y  f  rI  it( cc((fs;s
t i)  t Ii,  IA  IiC  I  k.  t  Ikc(  Wr.  "l'.  II  ill I  it  i| II r&. o. i  hI''  t  I  '  %  lo  T  I;)  l  a  t  ;  t  X  i  I.  I  lct  ot  ics wer  e
IIrchsl.o  ltv(I1  a  Soit  li  K'oreati/Nort  II  A  twr  i can  (Ilhci;flrt  i  I!lI  ill  I  '  ' ,  li  t I ough  ,  .iS  not  ed
abovc  the  K;ra  plant  is  11ow  cIosell  It a1 ;o  I av  cIelid  I(I  tl 
t II  ICiouilcecl  eIlt  of  plains
to  cs;tallish  a  '.Ilt.  yfree  manuifactinti  ng  zone,  a  project  l  by  a  iroup  of  US
illnvstors  ulider  the  ai'gis  of tbe  US  Ol'IC  and  tle  IFC.  Fxploi  '  i iig  t hl  EC  market  has
elen  a  mnajor  rea SonI  for  tie  over  $35  iln  prograimme  of  mod,r  iiisatioon  and expanision
of  I  a.i  rHo's  o  s)aDvi  (I  Ali I  tetea d  t ext  ile coClnyll  in Zimbael)We  wlii  Ie  new  investment  in
the  Botswanan  subsidiaries  of  both  Whitehead  (Zimbabwe)  and(  Zimbabwean-owned  Cone
Textiles  was  based  on  further  penetrationi  of  tlhe  Southl  African  anld  CSP-f'avoured  US
market  as  well  as  that  of  the  EC. 38
The  Lonrho/Whiteieand  example  is  one  of  the  many  instances  of  investment
funds  coming from ret  earnings  of companies  already present in  SSA.  As noted
above, this probably  ,nts  for well  in excess of half the "new" investments
taking  place  in  SSA  in  the  1980s.  There  are  other  particular examples  of
significant investments  being undertaken or planned  by TNCs  with a long  history of
involvement  in  Africa.  In  Nigeria, for instance,  in the  second  half of the  decade,
the United Africa Company (UACN), John Holt, Johannes Rau, Metal Box and Dunlop
have all either expanded their  operations or  moved into new a.eas of activity,  but
very little or no new external equity funds. 39
111.2  The Nigerian textile industry: a case of import substitution
The Nigerian textile industry provides an important example of the growth
of an industry geared to the domestic market but heavily dependent on imported
37  Lesotho's  manufactured exports tripled from  M58 mn in 1986 M145 mn by
1988.
38  Zimbabwe's textile exports rose from Z$14 mn in 1983 to Z$53 mn by
1987.
39  DDunlop  Nigerian Industries' new expansion plans were valued in 1987
at $37 mn, while UACN's large-scale farm project investment was valued at $28 mn
in  1985.  Similarly,  in  Kenya  the  Del  Monte  subsidiary,  KCL,  is  involved  in  a  $25
million investment and expansion programme.  In Zimbabwe TNC subsidiaries like
Lever Brothers and Leibigs, Lonrho, RTZ and Hoechst have all reinvested over $10
mn in  the  past few  years,  while the  Anglo-American  Corporation reinvested  over  $150
mn between 1980 and 1986.39
raw  mat or  I  a]s,  which  has  been  largyely  f'inanced  by  Pl) I.  its  dependence  on  imported
riaw  materials, in the  very  difficult  context  of  Nigeria',;  structurral  adjustment
prograttmme  (SAP), has meant that it  is  now  experiencing  a  strious  recession;  when
it  will return to  a path of growth is  very uncertain.  As a  result, it is unlikely
tlhat  the  existing  offshore  shareholders  will  make  new commitments  of capital in  the
foreseeable future.  Sinice  much of Africa's existinp,  stock of Fl)l  is  concentrated
in  loosely  comparable protected industries,  the  Nigerian textile inidustry  provides
a  signif'icant  example of the problem of attracting new investment.
The industry  was initially  developed in  the 1960s,  when a series of  companies
were established, as shown in Table 5.  In eight out  of these ten cases, the
offshore shareholder held a controlling interest, in most cases of close co 100%
of the equity.  By the 1980s the size of the industry had grown considerably,
although 22 mills still accounted for 70-80% of total capacity.  Their activi-es
cover spinning,  weaving, bleaching, dyeing,  printing  and other forms  of finisning,
and extend to man-made fibres as well as cotton.
The rapid rate  of growth achieved  by the sector from 1960 to 1982 (averaging
12.5% a year) was great:y facilitated by high  levels of protection.  In 1965,
tariff rates on comparable imports were 76% for spun yarn, and close to 200% on
bleachied  and printed finished products.  By 1980, the industry employed a work
force of about 70,000, and was the second largest employer of labour in Nigeria,
accounting  for  22%  of  manufacturing value  added.  Although  the  Enterprises
Promotion Decree of 1977 had restricted foreign equity holdings in the sector to
60%  of issued  share capital,  the  offshore shareholders  did not take the  opportunity
of the  many successful public flotations  held at that time  to allo'-  their share of
equity to fall below this level.  In fact, they continued to provide increased
quantities of debenture loans sourced from offshore.
The major recession in the Nigerian economy after 1982, initially caused  by
the fall in the oil price but followed by the subsequent period of adjustment,
caused a collapse in the production of woven fabrics, from, for instance, 655 mn
metres in 1982 to 275 mn metres in 1985.  Production remained close to this level
up  to  1989.  The  production  of  spun  yarn  has  also  fallen  by  a  comparable  amount.
In  response,  the  government  has  sought  to  encourage  the  industry  to  increase  the
local  sourcing  of  its  inputs.  Some  small  increase  in  the  volume  of  cotton  lint
purchased  within  Nigeria  has  been  achieved,  and  there  is  a  longer-term  hope  that
the petrochemicals industry  will produce fibres as  a by-product, but this is40
Table 5
Initial Foreign Investment in the Nigerian Textile Industry
Companiy  Year  Domicile
of foreign
shareholder
Kaduna  Textile Mills (KTM)  1958  UK
Nigerian Textile Mills (NTM)  1962  Italy/US
Norspin  1963  UK
Arewa  1964  Japan
United Nigerian Textiles (UNT)  1965  Hong Kong
Textile Printers of Nigeria  1965  Japan/UK
Nortex  1963  Sudan
Zamfara  1965  Sudan
Aba  Textile  Mills  1964  USA
Asaba  1965  UK
(turnkey)
Source:  Ohiorhenuan and Poloamina (1989).
surrounded  by uncertainties.
In  1987,  the  total  retained  earnings  and  reserves  of  the  22  leading  companies
of  the  industry  were  estimated  at  N312.4  mn  (on  an  equity  stock  of  N107  mn).  The
majority of this represented an asset for overseas shareholders, and at that time
was valued at $84 mn, at the  official exchange rate.  By  January 1990 the  value had
fallen to $39.6 mn (or $31 mn at the parallel market exchange rate).  Given this
halving of asset  values, the  prospect of continued  problems in sourcing inputs  and
v-ry slow growth in real incomes, it appears unlikely that the Nigerian textile
industry  will continue to attract FDI as it  has done in the past.  It provides a
sombre example of the fate of much FDI in import-substituting industry 'n SSA.
III.3 Export Processing Zones
One  approach  to  attracting  FD1  which  is  frequently  discussed  and  now
advocated  in  Africa,  as  in  other  parts  of  the  developing  world,  is  the41
establishment of Free Trade Zones, where a combination of favourable tax regimes
and efficient  infrastructure can attract export-oriented investment.  The  two
prime examples of this in Africa are in  Senegal and Mauritius: the former  has been
rather unsuccessful, the latter spectacularly successful.
Three points characterise the  Mauritian case.  First, the country succeeded
in initiating  investments tocalling about  $150 mn  from 1976-86  in the Export
Processing  Zone (EPZ). 40 Second, this  was distributed  between about 400 different
companies, and third, the  combined exports of the EPZ totalled $630  mn by the  year
1987, accounting in that  year for  more thaa  60% of the  country's total exports and
thus replacing the traditional dominance of sugar.  Foreign equity capital has
accounted for well over half the total, as shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Foreign Share in Total Equity. Mauritius EPZ. 1970-85
Years  Total no.  Total  Foreign  X
of firms  equity  Participation
(Rs mn)  (Rs mn)
1970-83  81  184  98  53
1983-85  102  241  165  68
Source:  Lamusse (1989).
Yet there would also appear to be some exceptional circumstances about the
Mauritian case.  Thus a very high proportion of foreign equity capital came from
Hong Kong, rising from 33% from 1970-6 to as much as 86% in the period 1983-85
(Lamusse, 1989:6 and Tables V-VII).  The specific interest of Hong Kong capital
in  Mauritius results  both from  the  presence  of an active  Chinese  business community
and from the need of the Hong Kong textile and garment industry  to avoid the  quota
40  Rsl.5 bn from 1976-87, financed from foreign and domestic equity, as
well as loan  capital, and assuming an average exchange rate over the period of
RslO = $1.  (See Lamusse, 1989: Table 8).42
restrictionis  on exports built  into the Multifibre Arranygeit-ent  (MFA) on textile
trading. The second, much smaller, source of investment  has-  been France, nurtured
by close  links between the French-speaking settler comnunity  in Mauritius and
metropolitan  France.  The  preference  of tiong  Kong  investors has  been  for a
controlling equity interest,  and their share has usually bekiin between 80 and 100%
of the total.  French investors  have generally  preferred  joint  ventures with shares
of between 35 and 80%.  Thus the  Mauritian FPZ  has not been dependent on NFI type
arrangements,  but  has succeeded in  attracting  a  major financial  coimmitment  from its
investors. A further important  characteristic  of the EPZ companies has  been their
ability to raise finance on the local market. Much of this was provided by the
sugar industry, which sourced 44% of the local equity capital from 1970-84.
None of this could have been achieved without a high degree of government
support (Lamusse, 1989:32):
The incentives granted by the Mauritian Government have taken the form of
duty-free imports of machinery, equipmenit  and spare parts, raw materials,
components and semi-finished  goods, the  construction of industrial estates,
concessionary  rental  on  electricity,  water  and  otlher infrastructural
services,  including subsidised air  and  sea freight,  free  remittance of
profits and dividends and free repatriation of capital (excluding capital
appreciation); loans and export finance at preferential rates of interest
from the  Development Bank of Mauritius and  commercial baniks,  and priority in
the allocation of loan capital. In addition, the Mauritian Covernment has
followed an "open door policy" vis a vis foreign investors: there is no
restiiction on foreign participation, and many EPZ  enxterprises  are 100%
foreign owned.  Other  incentives include tax rebates on the salaries of
foreigners  working  in  the  EPZ  and  a  constitutional  guarantee  against
nationalisation.
Support of this kind, however, is in itself clearly not enough to ensure
the success  of an EPZ.  In the  case of Senegal  ,  the fiscal  package offered included
total exemption from duty on all imported goods and materials, and exemption from
all indirect and direct taxation until 1999 - that is for 25 years for companies
establishing  themselves  in  the zone's  first year.  Efficient  infrastructural
facilities were also developed, taking into account the experience of successful
zones in  other parts of the world.  The zone was established in 1974, but by 1985
only seven firms were  in operation  there, all of which were exporting to the
countries of the region, mainly those of the Union Douaniere de l'Ouest Africain
(UDOA).;I4  §
Comparis;otis  of  the  i-t  *-rd of  the  Se-l  e.']e  zonle  ill  r(lation  to  that
ope  rati  ug itn  Mauritius  appe-ir  to i  udicate thar.  EPZs  are  ii  lv  to be successful
only  when certain  ,;pecial,  particular ingredients are prest'it.  The experience of
Mauritius, together with another success,  Taiwan, suggest that these include the
presence  of  a verv dvnamic local  business commuinity,  which is in  a  position to form
effective links with the overseas investors, and circumstances in which overseas
equity can be complemenited  domlestically  by  loan, if  ot e-quity,  capital.  In
additiorn,  the underlying structure of local costs must be competitive in world
terms: fiscal concessions can only reinforce a  cost advantage rather than offset
a cost disadvantage.  In the l980s, Senegal has been at a disadvantaLe in the EC
market as a resulc of the  value of the  CFA franc vis  a vis  most EC currencies.  The
evidence suggests that it will be difficult for most African countries to repeat
the  success of Mauritius in the development  of an EPZ,  although the conditions  may
exist in  special  cases. One of these  could  be the  EPZ  under development in  Mombasa,
Kenya.  A basic difficulty is that even if one or two EPZs are successful, and
perhaps  Togo will be one, there  is little  to suggest  that each sub-region in  Africa
would be able to attract sufficient foreign interest to support more than one or
two of  thlem.  Finally, however,  doubts have  recently been  raised  about  the
durability  of evet the  Mauritian success. Thus, since 1989,  the  performance of the
zone has become increasingly disappointing: exports rose by only 4% in 1989 and
forecasts for 1990 indicate  no rise in this growth rate; employment expansion has
all but halted, and the combination of high absenteeism and pressures to increase
real wages are eroding the international  competitiveness of the zone.
IV.  FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN SSA IN THE 1990s
IV.l  Overview
As  in  other  regions  of  the  world,  the  prospects  for  private  foreign
investment in SSA in the 1990s will be related both to investors'  perceptions of
the  opportunities  within the  country or sub-region,  and an evaluation of these  vis
a  vis opportunities prevailing in other parts of the world.  At a general level,
the  prospects for  SSA in the  1990s  remain  probably as poor as they  did in the 1980s
- and maybe even poorer.  There is little optimism that substantially higher
levels of real per capita incomes will be achieved, that the debt and foreign44
exchiange  crises  wi I  be  Si  j,gni f icatit  lv  (ase, t hat  t He  utie  I!  .i  nj  infrast  ructural
problems  of  transport  a nd  communicat  ion,  as  weh  I  as  the  s  hot  tage  of  key  skills,
will be solved in the short term.  Overall, opportunities exist for investment
related  to  the extraction  and  pi-ocessing  of those  minei  ral  and  agricultural  products
for  which price projections are  bullish, and in  some export-  or  ie  nted manufacturing
enterprises, but in general the SSA region is likely to remain less favourable to
the  inflow  of  foreign  investment than many countries in Latin America and Asia.
Three  new  factors  would  appear  to  downgrade  the  rankingp,  of  the  SSA  region
as a field for new foreigni  investment in the 1990s.  The first is the formation
of  the  single  European market. 4'  In  preparation  for  this  there has  been  a
significant relative increase in the flow of private  investment to the member
states of the EC as companies jockey for position, attempting to  be better placed
than their competitors to exploit the anticipated opportunities: there has been,
and is likely to continue to be, an increase in investment in the EC of  those
currently trading with the EC.  Both the focusing of attention upon Europe and
uncertainty  surroundi.ag  the  post-1992 European  Community  mean that the  early 1990s,
especially, are unlikely to be a period when a major shift of attention to  Africa
by foreign investors will occur.
Changes in, and the probable expansion of, a more homogeneous EC market are
by no means the  only new factors confronting those seeking to promote an increase
in inward investment flows to SSA.  Clearly  events occurring in  eastern Europe  and
in the Soviet Union since mid-1989 should caution one against predicting even the
seemingly obvious.  Yet it is  now widely anticipated that the new political order
emerging in the countries of eastern Europe, as well as in the Soviet Union, will
lead  to  the  opening  up  of  the  economies  of  at  least  Poland,  Hungary  and
Czechoslovakia.  Already, these changes, together with the unification of the two
Germanys, have not only raised the prospect for new private foreign investment
inflow into these countries, but significant inflows of private investment are
already  occurring in  at least  Germany, Hungry  and Czechoslovakia  and there  is  every
possibility that the pace and depth of interest in these countries will intensify
in the next few years: many companies are already undertaking costly evaluations
"4  In their substantial analvsis of the issue, Davenport and Page conclude that
"most of the implications for investment in developing countries appear to be
negative (lq9o:5q)IIId  sit 1il'i  ';  I"  (,  '  t i *  . jlt  I 'I  '  -t  I  la  i  t  I  act  as  vet
anTothe-r  f  *t  t  I  i  ;  t tI  t  I  t  t  tI.-  :  :  :wnrage  private
COmIpaIlies  t  (  i1VC St  inT  SSAX
'll  i r.  I  theI  v  l.is  I  y  l-,  rwing  ;iw1Ii-.-,  (Iuri  nr.  tl  e  u r'¢  of  the  1980s  of
tht  economic  imoport  ,nke  of  the  east  Asi  an  ri,hii  Some  US  -. vt  [iielnt  projections
sugg,t-st  tha.t  the  region)  is  like  lv  to  grow  t o  he  the  laDi  -;st  single  economic
regional  sub-grouping  by  'arly  in  the  twentv-  first  cent  nlv  yif  not  before),
exceeding  in  market  size  both  Northl  Ame:-ica and  an  enlargid  I`C.  As  a  result,
American  and  European companies especially have been  focusinig  their attention
increasingly in this area of the world,  looking for botlh  trade and investment
opportunities  - to  the detrimenit  of  sub-Saharan Africa.  This  is  likely to
intensify as the 1990s unfold.
These trends  themselves  need to  be placed  alongside the  perceptions  potential
foreign  investors have  of  the  returns  likely  to  accrue  from  investments  in
different parts cf the world.  Figure 6, reproduced from thie  recent World Bank
report on SSA, sends out two powerful messages.  First, the rate of return on
investment in SSA is extremely low - indeed lower than the current US prime rate,
adjusted for inflation - having  fallen steeply over an almost 30 year period.
Secondly, the miserable rate of return on investment in SSA in the 1980s compares
sharply and starkly with the high and growing (albeit  marginally) rates accruing
to investments in South Asia.
A major impediment to increased foreign private investment in Africa today
remains the low  level of domestic saving  and investment.4  Unless and  until these
ratios begin  to  rise and  potential  foreign  investors see  a  greater domestic
42  What is more  it is not only EC and Japanese companies which are investing in
these countries, but also companies from countries which miglht  be thought to look
more favourably  at investments  in  Africa.  Thus the Indian  hotel group Oberoi,  have
entered into a joint venture with Hungarhotels for a $60 mn hotel investment in
Budapest.
4  3  If,  however, there is rise in demand for tropical products in eastern
Europe, this could stimulate world prices of these products.
4  4  According to the 1988 World Development Report(WDR) (Table 5), the
ratio of  Gross  Domestic Saving  (GDS) to Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP) in all
developing economies in 1986  was 24%,  but only 11% in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the
gross domestic investment/GDP  ratios 24% and 14% respectively.  Out of 35 African
countries whose data were  individually recorded in the 1988 WDR, only 11 had
GDS/GDP ratios greater than 15X:  for 10 countries the rcitio  was lower than 5%.46
coiimitmneit  to investment, it  is unlikely thiat  aggregate foreign ilivestment  will
substantially increase.  In this context, note should be taken of a comment made
by the Vice-President of Equator Holdings which operates in 20 countries of SSA
(quoted in Development Business, 15 March 1987, p.19):
The Africans keep talking  about the  need for  a  Marshall Plan for  Africa
or abotit  the need  for massive foreign  private  investment and  our
feeling is that the  rest of the  world has pretty much abandoned Africa
as an attractive place to invest.  Conditions are going  to have  to
change  to  the  extent  that  indigenous  Africans  see  business
opportunities, take advantage of them and demonstrate success.  When
they are given the scope in the economy to become productive, retain
and reinvest the  proceeds of thair endeavours, that will attract the
attention of the rest of the world.  And  to the extent that those
opportunities are attractive, foreign investment will come in.  But
until Afri.^ans  themselves can generate some kind of positive results
in Africa, the rest of the world is certainly not going to pay much
attention there.
Figure 6
Rates of Return on Investment
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. 1961 to 1987
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The  implications would  appear  to  be  grave.  Aggregate  direct  foreign
investment is unlikely to rise significantly in real terms, and certainly not to
the extent necessary to bridge the gap hetween foreign capital inflows and the
shortfall in investment funds required to raise economic growth rates.  FDI as a47
share of total resource inflow is likely to remain low - less than 5% - and play
a minimal role in the important goal of raising the investment/GDP ratio in the
countries of SSA.  Even if the economies or SSA begin to grow at higher iates in
the 1990s than they did in the 1980s, it is unlikely that this ir.  itself will be
a  major  boost  to  new  inflows  of  foreign  investment.  The  SSA  region  is
characterised at present  by very low levels  of capital  utilisation.  Higher growth
rates are likely to lead, both initially  and for some considerable time, merely to
higher levels of plant and machine usage.
IV.2  Change in South Africa
These brief contextual comments on the overall climate for investment in
the  l9?0s  would  remain  incomplete  if  mention  were  not  made  of  recent  and
contemporary events in South Africa.  Following recognised convention, the sub-
region  of  sub-Saharan  Africa  excludes  South  Africa  because  of  the  world's
abhorrence and condemnation of the  apartheid  and non-democratic political system.
Yet not only has foreign investment played a significant role in the development
of the South African economy, but its  overall impact has been almost as important
as for  SSA as a whole.  Thus in 1985, the  total stock  of foreign  private investment
in  South Africa was valued at about $11  bn, compared  with only some $23 bn for the
whole of SSA; and in the period 1965 to 1974 the inflow of private investment to
South Africa averaged $190 mn a year.
Since  the mid-1970s, however,  there has  been  a  net  outflow of  private
capital, which accelerated from the mid-1980s onwards as a result, especially, of
disinvestment by United States corporations: from 1976 to 1988 there was a net
outflow of $2.7 bn.  This lack of investor confidence in the future of apartheid-
ruled South Africa, together with trade and foreign financing restrictions, not
only affected  adversely the  growth of the  South  African economy  but also  had ripple
effects throughout the economies of the neighbouring states of southern Africa,
severely depressing their growth rates. 46 What  is more, the vast majority of
investors  who withdrew from South Africa left the  continent completely.
45  Data from Lipton (1988), IMF (1989) and Riddell (1988).
46  For a discussion of the linkages between the South African economy
and that of its neighbours see Lewis (1987).48
Thle  release  ot  Ne]son  Mandel  a,  tile  LITI)hMillF,  of  the  Af rican  National
Ca0ngra',.SS,  the  Wi  li  igneSS  of  the  South  Africani  government  to talk  about  the  ending
of  apartheid and  discussions  about  the  inauguration  of  a  political  system  based  oni
universal  suffrage  raise  the  real  possibility  of  a  resolutioni  of  the  South  African
conltIict.  Such  an  outcome  could  have  a  major  impact  upon  the  prospects  for foreign
investment niot  onily  in South Africa itself but.  more widely in other parts of the
SSA area.  Although mnuch  clearly remains speculative, the following factors  can be
highl  ighted:
A  political settlement  in South Africa would  not  only
bring positive world attention to that country but would
provide the catalyst for investors  to take a new and more
"upbeat" look at the continent in general.
If a political settlement in South Africa is  achieved and
(as  has occurred in  Namibia) a  new government is  installed
thaL  is  on  balance  favourable  to  private  foreign
investment,  private  capital  outflow  would  cease  and
substantial  new  foreign  inflows to South Africa  could
easily occur.
With or without new private capital inflow, once trade
and  financial  restrictions  against  South  Africa  are
removed, higher growth rates of the South  African economy
can be expected.  These  should boost regional economic
growth  and  thereby  improve  the  climate  for  private
investment  in  the  Southern  African  Development  Coordination
Conference (SADCC)  countries.  If foreigners  do decide to
increase  their  investments  in  South  Africa,  the  possibility
of  ripple  investment effects occurring in  the rest of
Africa should  increase  because  a  South  African  economy  more
integrated with  the  rest  of  Africa would  provide  the
context for the exploitation of regional opportunities.
4 8
47  Even members of the  most radical  wing of the  African National Council
(ANC) now argue for increased foreign investment.  Thus in an interview  with the
Financial Times, Mr Joe Slovo stated (27 February, 1990):
Foreign capital will remain crucial to developmeznt,  and guarante-s of
stabilisation and security will be offered to enisure  investors  do not
avoid South Africa.
4  8  Swaziland and Lesotho, however, which have certainly benefited from
sanctions-busting investment,  would  be likely  to  be relatively  adversely affected,
at least in the  short term.49
Given  the  unIcert;i  nItV  of  the  chainges  in  Soutth  Africa,  it  would  be  prudent
110  t  to  0n  io  I,por  at  e  too  glseat  a  (lose  of'  opti  mi<,m ni  to  the  wiav  t hat  a  "best-case"
scenario  mighlt.  iinprove  the  overall  climate  for  f  orei  gn  invest  inetnt  in  SSA  in  the
1990s.  Yet  pessimism  at  the  aggregate  level  about  the  prospects  of  raising
signif'icantly  the level  of foreign investment in SSA in the  1990s  by  no  means  has
to lead  to the conclusion that  Af'ricati  countries remain  powerless  to  influence  the
level and degree of foreign involvement in the SSA region.  Section III above
highlighted  a  number of sectors  and  sub-sectors -in  iniring,  agriculture,  energy  and
tourism - in which foreign investors have been active in the 1980s against the
overall trends, as well as providing examples of companies in other sub-sectors
which have  either brought  in new  funds or  reinvestod retained earnings.  In
general, these sectoral  and sub-sectoral  opportunities  are likely  to continue into
the 1990s. while  changes  in perceptions of  the  future prices of mineral  and
agricultural commodities may well open up new and different opportunities for
investment in other primary products.
IV.3  Improving the Investment Climate by Addressing Specific Constraints
It  is  widely assumed that  future investment  inflows  will  be directly related,
minimally, to the package of direct incentives  which influence the expected rate
of return, the security of the investment and the scope and speed with which
companies  are  able  to disinvest.'
4 9 The  tdx  regime,  the  investment code  or
guidelines, and  overall macro-economic  policies, including  those  related to access
to foreign exchange,  domestic borrowing by  foreign companies,  the setting of
prices, wages and employment regulations, are clearly all central elements which
affect this overall package.  Section III.2  discussed the manner in  which these
instruments have changed during the course of the 1980s in most countries of SSA
to  become more favourable for  new foreign investment  inflow and the productive  use
of retained earnings of already-established foreign companies.
There is every indication that these particular trends will continue, if
not accelerate, during at least the first half of the 1990s, creating, broadly,
a more favourable and increasingly welcoming attitude to foreign investment.  In
4 9  For a general discussion of the influence of general incentives in
attracting foreign investment see-  Guisinger in  Moran et al. (1986).¶.)  ()
this context,  particular  note  should  be  made  of  the  followiiig,  factors  inhibiting
investment  where  action  is  still  nleeded:5
0
[D  Lack  of formal legislative  provision for foreign investment. Although
today  It  applies  only  in  a  minority  of  African  countries,  some
governments have still not published investment codes or provided a
clear-cut  policy  for  foreign  investment.  In  these cases  foreign
companies are reluctant to invest, in  nlo  small measure because of the
greater likelihood that th( host government will change the rules for
foreign investors.  Concern about the absence of fixed and certain
legislation  is  one  of  the  most  frequent  complaints  of  foreign
investors: if legislation is  changed, notice could  be given  and retro-
active legislation strictly avoided.
D  Lack of legal infrastructure.  Some countries still lack up-to-date
company legislation, and in these cases suitable amendments are an
urgent priority.  More widespread is the maintenance of traditional
land  tenure  legislation;  this  can  impede  exploiting  mineral  and
agricultural  potential.  For  some  products  produced  by  foieign
companies,  current  legislation  is inadequate, or  even  absent,  in
relation to patents or copyrights.  In some cases  this is because
countries without industries that depend on these  have never seen the
reason to develop such legislation. This is  a deterrent to  particular
classes of investment,  notably in  pharmaceuticals and informatics,  as
well as to various types of technology transfcr.
o  Price controls.  These are  a  major impediment  both because they lower
all returns on investment and because they create the need to secure
government intervention  for  routine  drceisions.  Some  countries  are  also
criticised  for erratic and  inconsistent policies on prices.  This
particular problem, together with restrictions on access to f reign
exchange to purchase imported  inputs into the  production process, has
been one of the most important obstacles to Japanese investment in
Africa.
50  Although not in all countries of the sub-region.,)I
Labour  legislation.  Iit  Af  ricai,  ((couI  ite-  t; i  hi  s  Iilts  b)eli mnost oftct
S(en  II  ai  ZIn  I  ',(t  it  1  e  Witth  re'ardl  t(O  c'lnp)  1)V1fley  lt  of  Uxi  pt  r  i it.es  ,  but
where  t Itre  at  severe  rest  riet ions5  oii  hi  riti,  antd  firingi,  of  workers,
these  are  likelv  to  be  seen  as  espec  iii  lv  serious  because  they  are an
pe rit ti  i II]  refst  r  ict  ion,  b(ecause  t  hey  re(  ui  ro  compat  i es  to  deal  with
unf  aini  liar  legisIat  Io[i,  anid  because  thtey  reduce  flexi  bility  wiien  demand
changes  anid  thus  increase  risks.
Li  Taxation policy.  In gerneral,  taxation policy appears most important
at  the time of  initial interest in investing  (the point at which
comparisons  with  other  countries  are  made)  and  before  operating
conditions become relevant.  Thus what  is often important at this
initial time is taxation policy in other countries: comparisons raise
the threshold of what companies expect (Page  and Riddell, 1988).  As
only a few industrial countries offer credit for tax not paid because
of concessions under dual taxation agreements (FRG  and Belgium among
the principal foreign investors),  concessions which may be beneficial
to local investors  could often be less valuable to foreign investors,
as well as being costly to governments. 5 1  Differentiated concessions
more  favourable to foreign investors are not generally regarded as
favourable,  because of the  potential for ill-feeling,  generally or by
domestic investors. 52
c  Foreign exchange controls, particularly on profit remittances.  As a
general  statement,  it  would  appear  that  potential  investors  are
unlikely to invest if companie-.  present in the country are unable to
repatriate their profits.  Yet most countries in Africa still have
51  Some experienced recipients of  foreign investment have argued that
the time limit on tax concessions could inhibit further investment by existing
companies unless carefully phrased, but in practice the advantages of familiarity
may well outweigh this.
52  To the extent that foreign investment is itself influenced  by whether
domestic businesses are investing, such concessions would thus tend to be dosed
with self-defeatism.Si g.i it  f  I  (it  f ore  iII  t XcI  i  1?',i  r(it  ni  not  hil,.iil  t  vtii  ill  t  le  (TA
f I alic  /orie  ..s  (lo  aliv  (oulit  l  ies  ii)  ot  lit  f  rt  l  ioils  of  t lie  wol- li.  I'ius
what  is  i inlport  ait  i S  th  e  at  tri:e  of  'ukI  tit  lo  Is  (or  ilw  xpe  t e d  cIlhanges
inl  them'l)  aindl  how  t  i(EY  cOiitpVi  (e  wit  IIt  .IIIV  ot  hir  (count1ieS  -a  potent  ial
investor  is  ConIsideril  rg.  cotrio  ,;e  QuIltrl  5  will  teInd  to  be  especially
influenitial if  they  are  set  witl  i  elereucc  to  the  local  (crrency  value
of  the initial  investment  ii  a  country>  wit  i  s(vere  d(i:8vluatiofls,  or  if
they  are  pari-t  of  all  unusually  tight  package  of  restLictions  on  all
outflows.
Particular  problems  still encountered  iniclude  the following:  the  requirement
that  management  and  "know-how"  fees  should  be  denominated  in local  rather
than  foreign  currency  - thus  exposing  investors  to  exchange  rate
fluctuations;  pressures  for an investor  to register  a corporate  presence  in
the  host  country  - so as  to register  himself  liable  for  local  corporation
and/or  turnover  tax; lack of clarification  in the interpretation  of corporate
tax codes  - opening  up  the possibility  of taxes  on dividends  and  fees  being
withheld  at both  the company  and country  level;  high  rates  of personal  tax
on expatriate  employees  - or penal  limitations  on their  remittability.
Exchange  Rate  Level.  The  majority  of African  countries  outside  the
CFA  franc  zone  have  devalued  their  currencies  by significant  amounts
in the late  1980s.  As  a result,  the potential  returns  to investments
which  generate  exports  based  on domestic  resources  have  improved,  and
these  include  returns  from  the crucial  minerals  sector,  In the many
cases where export-oriented  projects  are dependent  upon  imported  inputs
(such  as yarn  and  even  woven  fabrics),  however,  the increased  cost  of
these  inputs  needs  to be  set  against  the  anticipated  rise  in export
values.  In  the  case  of  foreign  investment  in  import-substituting
industries,  as  we  have  shown  in  the  case  of  Nigerian  textiles,  the
effect  of  devaluation  on  an  :nvestor  s  existing  portfolio  is
devastating.  The  long  run  benefits  in  the  form  of  an  increased
efficiency  in  the  utilisation  of  assets  i.l the  economy  as  a  whole
remain  nebulous  and  intangible.  The maintenance  of  the exchange  rate
between  the  CFA  franc  and  the  French  franc  at  50:1  has  made  the  CFAf i  nc(' Z(.lit  i  (  r-tle ' .. I  eXC't  Wi  t  I  !  (  t  >  ,';1;  t (A lt  I  i  ')-  s
t()  t lhe g('tic  i  pa t  '  I  11  *'d  *  ;Ur  i in  c  . ,  *  I  l  (-  iti  :  ''  I u  sItg  as  (t  Ie
eX  C  han11ge  rate  is  ilai  ni  a  nIed  at  abhout  t hi,  Ie ;  tl  he  value  of
investors'  exist  ing  port  folios  in  import  sulst  it  ktip,  i itdust  ries  in  thle
C  FA  f ranc  zone  wi 1 I  be mia  i  t ai  ned,  t ht  ,i  wi der  macro-(aL  oliioxic  pr(Ailems
will  make  i.icremental  investment  in  thuese  areas  un]ikely.  At  t his
exchange  rate  however-,  new  i lives  t men  inl  export  -or  i  e  ited  industries
1s  likely  to  remain  minimal,  even  with  a  high  doimstic  resotirce
component.
While the addressing of these specific problem areas should certainly help
improve the investment clim,ate  and raise the  prospect of greater flows of foreign
investment, two notes  of  caution  should be  sounded.  The  first  is thar.  the
anticipated positive consequences of further "liberalisation"  moves are unlikely
to make a  major aggregate and  positive impact,  for  the reasons  spelt out in section
II.3.2  above.  The second is that, ironically,  one of the traditional - and often
powerful - attractions of Africa for the foreign companies which chose to invest
there was the lack of competition.  To the extent that monopoly or oligopolistic
powers of potential investors  continue to be eroded, these will tend to act as a
counterweight to the investment-enhancing  policies.
There are, however, other broader factors which influence the decisions of
potential  investors  to locate within  particular countries  in the  sub-Saharan
region.  The rest of this section examines a number of major impediments which,
if addressed, would contribute to creating a more favourable climate for private
foreign investment in the 1990s.54
IV.  3.  1  The media
Africa, more than any other developinig  region, suffers from adverse media
exposure.5 3 The  importance of the media in forming judgemuitts  about investment
is  well brought out from a 1980s survey on US perceptions on Africari  investment:54
Respondents were asked how tihey  obtainied  their information in
making their risk asse  'inents  and invesfment decisions.  By far
the main  source of  information on Africa  for  the business
community is the mass redia, primarily the press.  Since the
American  press selectively  focuses  on trouble  spots, impressions
are  more  negative  than positive.  It  is  not  unusual  for
executives considering investment decisions  in Africa  to be
stopped dead in their tracks by a single unfavorable article.
The  chief  executive  officer  of  one  Amcrican  manufacturing  company
considering  an  investment  in  Zimbabwe  reported,  for example,  that
he had decided after reading two  recent  pieces in the  press that
the threat of civil conflict  and a socialist ideology dissuaded
him from further consideration of his  project.  He made no
attempt to  corroborate  or  probe impressions  gained in the  press,
either through contacting US government agencies or sending a
company representative to Zimbabwe to verify the  judgement.
To the extent that these US-specific perceptions can be generalised, they
suggest that even if the fundamental conditions for increased foreign invcstment
are established, it will frequently be necessary to spend considerable effort,
time and money on countering the negative view of Africa that is so prevalent.
One way that this can be done is for host countries to build upon the successes
o2 past foreign investment  ventures, mosc particularly  by using successful foreign
firms as advocates among potential investors in their own home country, both for
their investments and also for investing more generally in the SSA region.  This
particular area of investment  promotion is  comparatively  easy to initiate as it is
apparent  that many  foreign companies are themselves keen  to  take on such  an
advocacy role, as the following two quotations confirm, the first from the senior
Vi_  President  of the  US H.J. Heinz, the second  from the  chairman  of the  UK's Cluff
Resources:
5 3  For  a readable  analysis of the  problem see  Harrison and Palmer (1986).
54  Quoted  in  Baker  (op.cit.),  pp.50-51.55
Heinz  must  be prepared  to develop an  advocacy  role for  the
developing country in which Heinz invests, to intercede on the
country's behalf with the US Government and be prepared to put
the country's best foot forward in order to attract potential
investors among the developed nations. 55
Africa is in  many respects  highly preferable to the  more popular
exploration areas  of  the world,  such  as  North  America  and
Australia.  Not  only is there  less  competition in  Africa but  doing
business  is  actually easier  than  it is  portrayed.  Far  from being
bedeviled  by  bureaucratic  obstacles,  we  find  that  African
politicians  and  civil  servants  are  more  approachable,  more
practical and more reliable than their counterparts in Canada,
the US or Australia, for example. 
56
IV.3.2  Skill shortages
A more  specific imi.diment to  increased FDI in Africa  is that of  skill
shortage in the host economy.  In many countries this shortage covers management
and accountancy skills,  but even in countries like  Nigeria there is evidence that
the shallow base of a wide range of technical skills leads to inefficiencies and
low levels of productivicy which deter foreign investors.  This is also an area
where foreign investors see a large gap between what the  Asian and Latin American
countries  and the  average  African country  can offer,  not  merely for specific skills
but nmore  generally in relation to  basic education and familiarity  with equipment.
Companies that are accustomed to investing in other developed countries, or in
Latin America or Asia, do not themselves have the organisation or experience to
deal  with  countries  with  much  more  severe  local  skill  shortages,  and  this
perception does influence their view of operating in most African countries.
Skill shortages are particularly serious because they affect not only the
setting up of foreign-funded  plant and equipment  but also its  continuous operation
and its  adaptation to local  conditions.  There is little  doubt, for instance,  that
the emphasis  placed on technical training  and  planned maintenance schemes has  been
a  major  factor  in  the  advance,  diversification  and  competitiveness  of  the
manufacturing sector in Zimbabwe.  In contrast, the lack of planned maintenance
55  Letter to co-author, 11 J'une,  1984.
56  African Economic  Digest, 11  December 1989.  Cluff's attitude  puts into
perspective the  view about the  adverse factors  in  doing  business in  Africa.  As the
latter, negative, view is more widespread, the point reinforces the desirability
of  advocacv of the alternative  view bv those with first-hanid  knowledge of Africa.56
scheines  anid  shortages  of engineers  and related technical  staff in  the  vast  majority
of Africani  countries are  important restraints on potential foreign investment,
especially in  the  manufacturing sector, inhiibiting  the  opportunities  within Africa
for launching  export-oriented  enterprises to  penetrate Europe (under  Lome) and the
U'S  (under GSP preferences).  As the problem becomes particularly visible when
investors wish  to diversify  into new  sectors, it acts as  a major  constraint
inhibiting the "spread"  of foreign investmeLlt  away from those sectors to which it
is initiallv attracted.
A related issue is frequently that attempts to redress the skill shortage
problem through the importation of skills are frustrated because of restrictions
and lengthy bureaucratic delays involved in obtaining work permits for necessary
skilled foreign workers.  This problem continues to concern foreign investors,
for example, in the more advanced economies of Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.
Addressing these particular constraints should thus  be a particular priority for
countries wishing to attract foreign investment.
IV.3.3  Inadequacies of the domestic infrastructure
A major impediment  to foreign investment in  many African countries has been
and continues to be the poor state of the infrastructure.  Poor or inadequately-
repaired roads, delays in receiving or shipping goods on the railways, delays at
the ports,  faulty  telephones,  unreliable  or  unavailable  telexes  and  telefax
machines - important  especially for  export-related investment -have  all led  to low
levels  of efficiency in  current  productive sector  investments  and  have deterred  new
investors.  Although  the  disadvantages  of  poor  transport  and  communications
structures affect all  investors, they are  likely to affect  foreign  investors
disproportionately.  By their nature, they are more dependent on them than an
"average" company.
As a result, potential investors are likely .o look carefully at the degree
to  which the thost  government is allocating its resources to investment:  if the
infrastructure is in  a poor state and, moreover, little  or disproportionately low
levels of  funding are being  allocated to  infrastructural investment,  foreign
investment.  inflow is likely to  be extremelv limite..  Where structural adjustment
conditionality has led to a significant contraction of public sector investment,
private sector investment  has already  been adversely  affected,  In contrast, well-7
inai  itai  ned arid  efficieent i  nfrast  ructure  is c(rtainly  a  factor which  attracts
potential investors.
To the extent that some areas of infrastructural investment have been and
continue to he barred to private, and particularly to foreign, investment, there
is  tno  obvious  way around  such  an obstacle,  except  through  expanding infrastructural
projects funded by external official assistance, or initiate build-own transfer
techniques  as practised in a number of  middle-income countries in the  Near and Far
East.
IV.3.4  Bureaucratic delays and lack of decisions
Another common impediment to foreign investors has been and - in spite of
some clear advances made  in recent years - continues to be a range of factors
associated  with the  administration and decision-making  arm of the  host government.
These frequently begin  in long delays  - sometimes stretching  into years  - in
obtaining the initial permission to invest in the country, even when the foreign
investment  conforms in  every  way  with the  respective  investment  code of  guidelines.
Thereafter, managers of foreign investment projects  (frequently in common with
their  domestic counterparts) face numerous  administrative  hurdles  which need to  be
overcome, often repeatedly, in order to operate their companies.  These include
matters  such  as  obtaining  licences  to  import  and  export  products,  seeking
permission to hire and fire workers, obtaining approval to fix and raise prices,
etc.
Some obstruction, as in any country, may be deliberate, particularly when
foreign investors (who perceive themselves as powerfu'l  agents, especially when
locating in a small country) try to obtain a concession or particular treatment
without  formal requirement.  But much delay occurs because of inexperience or
inappropriate proced!res.  This is particularly damaging t.o  foreign investment
because these investors are more aware of it, being familiar with procedures in
other countries.  Thev, too,  have the choice of where to invest.
There  is no doubt  that the creation of  "one-stop" investment centres is
helpful in addressing at least the initial part of this range of problems, and
more countries in the sub-region clearly need  to introduce this feature.  But it
needs to be stressed that the problem of bureaucratic delay is far  wider.  Unless
fut-ther  steps are taken to cope with the mvriad of complainits  foreign investors
make in this area, this impediment  will remain a significant deterrent to future
investment flows.58
IV.3.5  Country size and regional  markets
The disadvantage of smallness for attracting foreigin  investors cannot l,e
over-stressed:  restricted purchasing power associated with the small size of the
market in  many African countries  has proved a serious impediment  both to investors
whose output has been exclusively for the domestic market and to those who have
required a strong domestic market as a base for export-orienlted  production.  But
the problem goes much further than the obvious ones of a smaller  market, offering
fewer profitable opportunities  because of economies of scale.  The absolute level
of profits will be small, and in the context of a firm with limited managerial
resources, the costs of gaining information (which will be little d.fferent from
those for a larger country) may deter investment in most sub-Saharan countries.
As a result of these  problems, economic integration is  widely seen as being
one of the key  factors to progress and one on whose success foreign investment
inflow is expected  to be boosted.  Yet  in spite of renewed talk of  regional
integration in the 1980s, the reality is taat the '.  -,e  of substantial change must
realistically remain distant.  The institutional a;-rangements  underlying closer
integration  - from  the  UDEAC to  the  Preferential  Trade  Area of Eastern and  Southern
Africa (PTA) - are frail and under-financed.  In particular the classical problem
of generating  benefits to  economically  weaker states from  economic association are
demonstrably unsolved.
In  West  Africa,  in  particular,  the  picture  remains  bleak.  The  two
Francophone customs unions remain in existence and of course continue to operate
a common exchange  rate with all other currencies.  Trade with  the Anglophone
countries of the region is brisk but informal and largely illegal.  The Economic
Community of West African  states (ECOWAS) has  attempted to operate a currency
clearing system through the  West African Clearing House (WACIi),  but this  has been
unable to finance the deficits of those  countries  with a conttinual  trade imbalance
- at least officially - with the group as a whole.  Furtlher,  the member states
continue to pursue competitive incentive regimes towards FDI, even though this is
explicitly ruled out by Articles 28-32 of the ECOWAS charte(r.
In the east and south, the creation of the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference  (SADCC) and(  the Preferential Tradc Agreement  (PTA) of
Eastern  and Southern Africa provide sotne  encouragement.  Already the creation of
SADCC would  appear  to  have  stimulated  some  foreigni  investment,  on  a  joint  venture
basis,  to  exploit  the  new  opportunities  presented  by these  developments.  Problems,IioW,VVr,  remai  n, niot  t  Iie  ]Iast  of  wlii  cli  is t  Ie slior  t  age  of t  r.,de  finance  and  export
credits  without whichi  regionaal  trade is lik-lv to remailn  at its  current low level.
It could be  argued that it is inappropriate to attribute the stagnation in
EDI in the l(F)s to the small size of domestic markets sinice  these markets were
probably even smaller in the 1970s,  at least if  measured in ielation to  population
size.  The rise in investment during this period (see Figures 4 and 5, above) was
very  modest  (less than $4 billion  from 1975 to 1982), at a  time when  Latin
American countries (for  the most part with much larger  markets) saw an increase  of
nearly $50 billion.57  What is more, uncertainty, if not pessimism, about the
development of regional markets was also prevalent in the 1970s, 58 and together
with  the various  nationalisation  strategies adopted  in that decade  certainly
contributed to  Africa's relative  lack of attraction as an  home for investment  even
at that time.
IV.3.6  ProvidinE matching finance
We return finally to the issue of financing investment, and shall consider
first offshore, and then local finance.
(i)  Offshore finance
Trends  in new  forms of investment for external investors in Africa have
important implications for the financing of projects.  If outside  "investors"
will bring in only token quantities of equity finance, this means that - in order
to avoid unacceptable gearing ratios - increasing quantities must be raised on
domestic capital markets.  It also means that the aggregate level of investment
will be assisted if external  development finance institutions (DFIs)  can increase
the  proportion of their  project finance  made  available as equity. Those DFIs  which
are based in the EC - such as the Commonwealth Development Corporation and the
57  The rise was from $21 billion in 1975 to $68 billion in 1982.  See Dunning and
Cantwell (1987).
58  The East African Community was formally  wound up in 1978.Cai  sse  Cct<t  rai  IdC  (t- Co  opt-ra3t  .1i  Lcoiiotmi  ili  tic."  hIavt  i  t ot  ,I  ock  of  i iivtst  ment  s
coinpri  siItI,  h)ot I  loa  II; ani  eI(quitv  of  a Bout  IC.  .*')  hIt.  Yetl  '  h  (e(Ui  tv  compolellt
accounts  for  only  about  47  or01-  ECU  £t,' CII  of  _  Bi I('t  I  Th;'  I Undt  s  are  mainlv
co-  i  tivest  ed  with  pri  Vat  L  stet  or  companies  rol,  t he  Et.  anz(  it I  invest  ors  in  the
tiost  count  rv  (wh ! ch  have  f IqUeIlt  ly bee-ll  p  as t ait  al organ!is  , i otis)  The  DFIs  are
often  associated  with  projects  in  which  the  ext  ernal  privat,-  sector  investor  has
a  strong  interest  in  the  type  and  strutcture  of  the  "NFl.
The  exiSt  enCe  an(1  prom101iTnce  of  th-ese  agentcies  providcs  an  opportunity  for
them to play a major role as "facilitator", in improvinig  the investment climate
for  both existing and  potential  private sector  investors, Given investors'  growing
preference  for NFI,  there is an  acute need  to avoid very  high and  therefore
unfavourable, loan-to-equity  ratios  by increasing  the  volume of  equity-type  finance
from "third  party" sources, such  as these FDIs  and, of course, the IFC.  This  need
not be restricted to formal share capital,  but should increasingly  extend to forms
of "near-equity", such as preference shares, and to the underwriting of share and
bond issues on African financial  markets.
In other ways,  too, it is desirable for  the DFIs  to "liberalise" their
lending conditions if their activities are to continue to expand.  In  many cases,
their support  for a  project  is conditional on a  governient guarantee of  the
repayment of loan principal and of interest  payments; sometimes there is a demand
- which is  favoured, for instance,  by the IFC - that  a supplier of  NFI should  have
a minimum equity stake of about 25% of the equity capital; sometimes there is an
insistence that "concessions" granted to one equity holder should be granted to
all.  A by-product of the search for a guarantee is that  where the loan is made tc
a  local finance house, the exchange risk is frequently passed on to the final
borrowers.  In the 1980s - with the  wide experience  of currency devaluation - this
has, in many instances, been disastrous for the cash flow of the target project.
Alternative approaches to dealing with  the difficult problem of local currency
depreciation include  allowing the final  borrower to select  between a high interest
rate with no exchange risk, and a lower interest rate with  the exchange risk.
59  Others  would  include  the Deutsche  Entwickluttgsgesellschaft  [DEG),
Societe  Belgique  d'Investissement  tSBI]  ,  "Industrial  Fund  for  Developilng  Countries"
[IFU),  "Finance Corporation  for  Developing  Countries"[FMO], and  the  European
Jnvcstnment  Bank !F.IB>.1
W  it  thott t hese  k i n(15,  f  f  )'it  i (i.tS  te  ,il(  I  itb  i  tt  I  hi  !j  I  ..,ti  ,i  )  ia  t  i-  i  t  I  TiMaC  i al
p)aCk,,es  ill  support  of  1D)t  II).VW  1)(  '.Vit  I%,  I i  1  I(,  1'  li'  It  (lee  dc  li  n  in t  he
nurmbe r  of  project  s  f  i  nanced  by  t le I  FC f  rom 1  988 t o  1 989  h iI .i.  Ii  gt  c(d  above)  part  1 y
reflects these probleins.
(ii)  Local  Jinanlce
Manv  potential  projects  fundled  by  D)FIs  face  a  problem  in  raising  local
currency finance to match offshore loan and equity capital.  For the European
Investment Bank's projects in the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group (in
which Africa is the most dominant) from 1976-85, more than half the total finance
had to be raised outside the host country (see  Githongo, 1988).
Lack of access to domestic capital markets is most frequently  encountered
through restrictions placed on borrowing locally.  Foreign companies may also be
prevented from buying  into local companies.  This  is particularly serious for
companies which  are also prevented from remitting abroad all their profit and
dividend payments. 60 Countries  may also restrict foreign ownership of land, or
entry  into  particular  sectors. Those  where  the  extent  and  nature  of  restrictions
are uncertain or changeable,  such as Zambia, are likely to be particularly
discouraging  for  investors.
Current  evidence  suggests  that the relative  shortage  of domestic  capital
for lending  or investing  long term is seldom  due to the low level  of time and
savings  deposits,  but  much  more  often  to the  relative  profitability  to the  banks
and  other  financial  institutions  of lending  short  term.  In  fact,  time  and  savings
deposits  as a proportion  of total  deposits  in  Nigeria  grew from  30%  to 60%  from
1960-88. In Zambia  in 1988  these  categories  of deposit  accounted  for  50%  of all
savings,  and  in  Kenya  for  65%. This  fairly  high  proportion  of long-term  saving  is
not  just  due  to  the  move  to  positive  real  interest  rates  which  has  been  engineered
as part of structural  adjustment  in  the 1980s. In  Kenya,  quantitative  estimates
suggest  an interest  rate  elasticity  of  0.6. In  Nigeria,  "it  is  quite  possible  that
60  The  Chairman  of  RTZ  in  Zimbabwe  publicly  drew  attention  to  this  problem
in  May 1988.savintg is rel  at  iv(ly i  ntterest  -inel  ast  ic and  that  other  fi  t  015  - such  as  distance
f  romn  an(d  wai  t  i  ng  t  i  me i  n batnks - may  he mo  rlt  power  f uL  in  f  I ut. tic e s  on  saving".61
Central  Batnks  have  endeavoured  to  respond  to  the  pi  ohlerm  of  shortage  of
local  capital for investment  projects by laying down guidelinies  on thle  volume of
batiks'  loan portfolio whicth  should be  long-term.  In the case of  Nigeria,  the
target figure in 1988 was 50%, but the actual level was oiulv  30%.  Liwever, tthe
crucial shortage is frequently in the field of risk capital and sp ^ifically of
equity.  The mobilisation of such capital is  not dependent oli  the existence of a
stock  exchange  but could  equally  well be achieved  by the launcll  of local  investment
trusts, shares in  which could be taken by existing local finanlcial  intermediaries
such as insurance companies, pension funds and even local "grass roots" savings
groups, which frequently find it difficult to re-invest  their deposits.  Such
trusts  might also seek to attract capital flight from  domestic sources.  Given the
continuing attraction to the banks of lending short term, there is a strong case
for the development of this innovatory instrument,  or for the activation of stock
exchanges.
Without initiatives of this nature, the task of mobilising local financial
resources to match offshore investment are likely to prove elusive.
IV.4  A More Active APRroach to Investment Promotion
The proposals for change just ottlined are grounded in the view that there
is a positive relationship between the removal of various impediments and a rise
in  the  inflow of  foreign  investment.  This,  in  turn,  is based  on  two  key
assumptions.  The  first  is  perfect  or  near-prefect  knowledge  of  investment
opportunities in SSA.  It is assumed that potential investors are aware of the
opportunities in Africa and that once sufficient identifiable restrictions are
removed investment  will flow.  The second assumption is that there is a known and
tangible group  or list, of "potential investors" interested in investing in the
SSA region to whom this near-perfect knowledge is available. 62
61  This quotation, and the statistics quoted here, are all taken from
Githongo et at (1988).
62  We have already suggested that events and attitudes outside the SSA
region provide few grounds for believing that significant increases in foreign
investmert inflows  would follow  the continued  removal of impediments in  particular63
These assumptions tend to lead to the dominance of what can be termed the
passive approach to the promotion of foreign investment.  The passive approach is
based on the view that it  is broadly sufficient to devise a package of incentives
(hopefully longer and better than one's neighbours'), to list the areas of the
economy or sub-sectors  where foreign investment  would be  welcome, and then  sit  back
and wait in  hope that the new investment  will be forthcoming.  Not infrequently,
host governments also provide a "shopping list" or register of often scores of
projects in which they  would like foreign participation. 63 One reason why
this  passive approach to foreign investment  appears to  be so influential in SSA is
that many governments are unclear precisely  which areas of the economy they  would
like to see developed, by whom and in which order of priority.  It would also
appear that the international institutions, or at least consultants employed by
them, have encouraged governments to adopt the passive approach. 6'
In contrast, an active approach to foreign investment is characterised by
governments aoing out and a2pnroaching  specifically-targ-eted  foreig-n  investors.
with a view to their investing-  in the development of a -product  they inroduce  in
the home or another country. or at least in a particular sub-sector.  This more
aggressive approach is likely to be most effective to the extent that the host
government has decided upon its future investment portfolio in some detail, and
has a view, too, on the areas in which it believes local investors will become
involved and those areas where it is convinced that it needs  foreign finance,
technology, know-how, machinery and/or marketing skills and/or contacts.
Equipped with  a  list of potential projects  it wants  to be  executed by
foreigners (in whole or in part), the next step  - in the active approach - is
for the host government to do three things:
countries.
63  Not infrequently, too, this list is cobbled together hurriedly, and
with little enthusiasm, by civil servants at the request of ministers who have
been  persuaded  by  well-meaning  donors  to  host  an  international  investment
conference.
64  This itself is probable influenced  by the fact that the advisors from
these institutions tend  predominantly to  be economists, for  whom market theory and
market forces are  of major importance,  rather than  hardened investors,  among whose
prominent  tools  of  trade  have been  negotiation and  bargaining  processes  and
techniques.64
g(  anrd  seek  out  those  comnpanies  whic(hl  are  ab  Ie  to  provide  the
identified  missing  components;('5
invite  them  to  examine  the  details  of  the  proposed  project  areas or
products for which foreign participation is sought; and, finally,
tI  propo)se  tihat  t hey put forwa  rd t he co  nditioons  under  whiich  they  would
conlsider  participating.
They  would  of  course  be  miade  aware  thlait.  other (rival)  companies  in  the  same
field were  also  being  approached.  Then  begins  the  process  of  bargaining  and
negotiation which, hopefully, will lead to firm investment proposals from one
company being accepted by the  host govermnent.
This active approach to attempting to obtain foreign investment should not
be seen as an alternative to the passive approach, but rather as complementary to
it.  General  guidelines,  the  overall  macro-economic  environment,  and  the
streamlining of the decision-making process are all necessary components of a
total  investment  strategy.  They  remain,  however,  by  no  means  sufficient
conditions.  Nor - one needs to hasten to add - is it being suggested here that
a combined  active and  passive  approach is  sufficient  either.  Rather, this  combined
approach adds a major - and different (active) -component to the package which is
prevalent through most of the SSA region.
The active approach is  not based on the assumption that potential investors
have perfect knowledge of opportunities in far-off places, or on the assumption
that  "potential" investors  in Africa know  that  they are potential  investors.
Rather it is based on widely-held view that a direct approach may often be the
catalyst  required  for a company  to begin  to think about  SSA  as a  field  for
investment. This direct approach is  likely  to  be of greater importance  the sma!ler
the host country, the less it is in the international news media, and if press
comment commonly portrays the country in a poor light.6 6
65  In some circumstances this could be companies  from the industrial
countries at the frontier edge of technological development, in others southern
TNCs could be more appropriate.
66  The opposite extreme can be illustrated by the case of Mexico where,
within weeks of the announcement of new regulations for foreign investment in  May
1989, some 40 foreign investment  applications for projects with an estimated $900
mn had arrived at and were under study by Mexico's National Foreign Investment
Commission (CNIE) (Financial  Times, 25 May, 1989).6 5
Iitermat  io  anal  or  I ndust  ri  Il  count  ry  i nvest  mett  mi ;ions  are  not  without
their  merits.  Indeed,  and  especially,  invest  Mne!t  missions  froin particular
indust  rial  countries  wi  tlI  expert  ise of  invest  ment  projects  in  the  countries  to  be
visited  can  of  ten  provide  an  irifluelltial  stimulus  to  investmelt  . Such  initiatives
should,  therefore,  also  be  seen  as  part  of  thie  overall/complementary  approach  to
investmiietit  promotion.  A  recenit-  example  of  thiis  would  be  the  US  OPIC  mission  of
potential  US  investors  to  southern  Africa  in  April  1989.6)  This  led,  for  instance,
to  a  joint  venture  agreement  witth  the  Houston-based  Interkiln  for  the  manufacture
and export of roofing tiles, bricks and other clay products from Botswana.
A major factor in favour of thie  wider applicability of the active approach
to  foreign  investment  is  the  successes  that  the,  albeit  limited, number  of
countries of SSA Ihave  had in attracting foreigni  investors on the basis of a more
positive  and aggressive selling  of  particular opportunities. We can end  with a few
examples.
a  The textile  plant privatisation in  Togo was concluded in February 1987
only after the government had considered eleven competitive bids from
foreign  investors  as far  afield  as India,  Western Europe  and the  United
States.
o  Bridge  Oil  of  Australia  became involved  in  Guinea following  an  approach
by the  Guinean government to  a Swiss  banker in 1981  looking for  a  joint
venture partner.  The Swiss banker was a friend of the chairman of
Bridge Oil.  As a res:ult  Bridge Oil did a feasibility study and "the
more it  looked  at the  prospect, the  more it felt it  should  be involved"
(Financial Times 9 November, 1988).
L  Botswana has declared Selibe Phikwe a special investment zone where
a 20-year tax holiday  is open to companies willing  to invest.  In
1990, the government is sending out special missions to East Asia to
sell the idea,  targeting in  particular textile  manufacturers,  with the
additional carrot of preferential terms of entry to the EC under the
67  The suc-oess  of this particular trip was in part attributable to the
identification of particular projects by Equator Bank.66
Lome Convention.  One mission is going to Hong Kong, targeting
companies  considering  up-rooting  from  the  colony.
V.  CONCLUSIONS
Foreign  investment  will  be required  in  SSA  increasingly  in  the  1990s  to  help
raise  the  supply  of foreign  exchange  and to boost  investment  levels. Continued
high foreign  debt repayments,  poor prospects  for  primary  commodity  prices  in at
least the first  half of the 1990s for most countries  in SSA, and lower than
required  inflows  of official  development  assistance  all mean that the foreign
exchange  gap  which  widened  in the  1980s  is set to continue  to restrain  economic
growth  in  the  1990s. This,  together  with  other  macro-economic  influences,  will  in
turn tend to dampen  prospects  for raising  domestic  savings levels,  crucially
necessary for boosting the sub-region's  dangerously  low levels of domestic
investment.  Both  the  foreign  exchange  gap  and  the  savings  gap  could  be filled,  at
least  in  part,  by increased  flows  of foreign  investment.
Foreign  investment  inflow  will occur  in the  1990s  (as  it did  in the  1980s)
largely  in relation  to opportunities  in a number  of key sectors,  such  as energy,
and  certain  minerals,  but  additionally  in  relation  to  selected  export  manufacturing
opportunities  - largely  a new  phenomenon. These  new  manufacturing  opportunities
are likely  to develop  in relation  to gaining  privileged  access  to large  markets
outside  the  African  continent,  as  well,  perhaps,  as in  the  tourist  industry.  These
and all other opportunities  should  be taken  and  exploited,  at least  in part by
extending  a  more  aggressive  and  project-specific  marketing  technique  to  attractive
potential  investors.  The  least  attractive  areas  for  the  foreign  investor  in  Africa
in  the  1990s  are  likely  to  be in  exclusively  import-substituting  industrialisation.
There is, however,  no realistic  prospect  whatsoever  for flows  of foreign
investment  to  be  adequate  to  bridge  either  the  foreign  exchange  or  domestic  savings
gaps.  Indeed  there  are grounds  for  suggesting  that in  spite  of the  extension  of
policies  more  liberal  to  foreign  investment  inflow  - which  are  certainly  being  put
in  place  in  most  countries  of SSA  - the  prospects  for  foreign  investment  inflow  in
the  1990s  may  well  be worse  than  they  were in the  dismal  years  of the  1980s. In
part  this  conclusion  is  based  on  external  factors  - prospects  in  other  parts  of  the
rapidly  changing  world  look  brighter  and less  risky  and  are  closer  to  home.
In  part,  too,  the  conclusion  is  based  on the  history  of  the  1980s.  Foreign
investment  prospects  are in some  way  bound  up in a  Catch-22  scenario. Potential
investors  are  unlikely  to commit  large  amounts  of money  to the  SSA region  unless67
and until the prospects foe growth improve.  But, given the other constraints on
development,  these are  likely themselves  to be  influenced by  the  success  of
countries in  attracting greater  amounts of  both public  and  private foreign  capital.( :i
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